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Chapter 1  
Social Capital and Agricultural Productivity 
1.1 Introduction 
There are two kinds of capital to be considered as main sources of economic growth: physical 
and human capital. Physical capital embodied in equipment and machines facilitates 
production whereas human capital embodied in human beings makes their capabilities and 
skills work in producing output. Solow (1956) argued in his classic, however, the long-run 
growth is not determined by the accumulation of production factors due to their attribute of 
diminishing marginal returns. Thus, I want to focus on the third source of growth, social 
capital. Just as physical and human capitals are productive so is social capital. The social 
capital inheres in the structure of relationships among people, that is, a person must be related 
to others (Portes, 1998).  
 Korea has experienced the remarkable growth of output per capita averaging 9 
percent per annum for three decades since the economic take-off in the 1960s. Accordingly, 
most of conventional researches have shown that Korea could achieve the extraordinary 
economic development by accumulating factors of production (Krugman, 1994; Young, 1995;
and Pyo and Kwon, 1991). Krugman (1994) claimed that “Once one had taken the effects of 
these more or less measurable inputs into account, there was nothing left to explain”.
 It is true that production factors were main determinants on growth of output per 
capita, particularly, in urban areas where the industry-based development is the key driving 
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force. As the differences in per capita income are matched by differences in production 
technology, urban parts of Korea had been richer than the rural in the earlier stage of
industrialization. Then, is it applicable to agriculture-based rural communities where 
community norms and trust among village people are relatively more important value than 
those in urban areas? Is there other factor than production factors to affect the agricultural 
productivity considering the fact that trust, cooperation, and information sharing among 
neighbors in the rural villages are necessary in doing farm activities? Do we observe the 
faster growth of per capita yield in rural communities where village people are more likely to 
participate and cooperate in community-level projects? Then, can we say that not only factors 
accumulation but also productivity growth employed by social capital is one of sources of 
Korea’s rural development program? 
 The gap in per capita income between urban and rural regions during the late 1960s 
and early 1970s started to decrease after the initiative of Saemaul Undong, which is rural 
infrastructure development program aimed at reducing the urban and rural disparities. In fact, 
in the mid-1970s per capita income in rural areas exceeded that of urban. Given the stylized 
fact that rural people are poor due to low agricultural productivity, agricultural productivity 
significantly increased during this period mainly because of constructions of rural 
infrastructure. How did Korea’s poor rural regions rapidly increase agricultural productivity 
in the 1970s in the face of nation-wide rural community development? 
 People in rural communities are tied by trust based on personal relation throughout 
trans-generation within the shared and limited space. Korea’s rural communities and village 
are, in general, tied by blood, geographical separation and rice cultivation activities. These 
communities have complemented the state and market in providing local public goods by 
inducing community people to voluntary participation and cooperation based on trust and 
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personal interaction.  
 Accordingly, convergence among Korea’s rural regions in terms of the growth of rice 
yield in the 1970s had been facilitated where the community-level development projects are 
successfully implemented and the village members are more actively involved in common 
village development projects. My hypothesis is that rice farming-based rural Korea was able 
to show faster growth of yield by virtue of greater social capital. Social capital accumulated 
by cooperation and participatory mechanism through community-level development projects 
is an essential source of growth in a sense that only strong ownership through the grass-root 
efforts in doing community development results in a sustainable growth.  
 This paper uses the data at a county level in the 1970s to verify the issue of whether 
social capital plays a role in increasing the growth rate of agricultural production together 
with other kinds of capital. A modified neoclassical growth regression that includes the proxy 
for social capital as well as stocks of physical and human capital provides a description of the 
cross-county performance. In addition, I focus on the idea that social capital is endogenous 
and shows reverse causality by which initial income level, village ties and governance system 
are employed within communities. 
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1.2 Participatory mechanism in rural community development  
1.2.1 Rural community development program 
The nationwide community-level infrastructure development program was initiated by the 
government in 1970. The Ministry of Home Affairs (1974)1 reiterates that “The goal of 
Saemaul Undong is to better not just myself but also my neighbor, village, and people of 
Korea” especially in the rural farming and fishing regions. It also emphasizes “the
development of the community where benevolent neighbors help each other for improving 
the welfare in society”. 
 The comprehensive community development initiatives started to make rural 
communities better places for living because rural areas based on agricultural sector lagged 
behind compared to urban due to low agricultural productivity. In addition, since Korea 
experienced rapid economic development starting from urban areas where light industries 
brought economic prosperity to, the income gap between urban and rural areas had been 
widened in the absence of the non-agricultural sector in rural parts of Korea. The farm 
household income was about two third of urban household income in 19702.
 The Ministry of Home Affairs was in charge of the implementation of Saemaul 
Undong in cooperation with local governments. The government provided materials 
including cement and steel wires to be utilized only in community development projects with 
each village, about 32,000 villages throughout the country. The fact that materials were 
allocated to a “village” not an individual explains how Saemaul Undong could be 
successfully completed in mobilizing people’s positive participation in community-level 
projects. A village naturally generated based on rice cultivation activities was assigned as a 
???????????????????????????????????????????
1 The Ministry of Home Affairs published annual reports on Saemaul Undong. This borrows from 
Saemaul Undong: from the beginning to today (1974). 
2 Ministry of Home Affairs (1978) 
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strategic development unit for Saemaul Undong3.
 In a sense that farmers’ cooperative group has been traditionally operated at a village 
level and neighbors help out on each other’s farms in rural areas, the village-level 
development design and support was a key successful factor of Saemaul Undong. Not only 
physical supports but also evaluations and rewards were executed based on village-level. The 
village itself was a good instrument to encourage the competition between neighbor villages 
as well as induce the village people’s participation in communal projects. In the case of large-
scale project4 which requires participation and cooperation across several villages, for 
example, when building the bridge in the river over several villages, it was less likely to 
successfully complete projects due to the lack of effective coordination and cooperation 
among different stakeholders by community. 
 The Ministry listed up about 20 projects such as construction of access roads to 
villages, bridges, roof, public baths, small reservoirs, dike, water ways, and river arrangement 
etc. and recommended to villages which projects could be mostly undertaken by types of 
village5. In doing so, the government drew up the concrete guideline and manual for the 
projects while facilitating technical assistances by dispatching counsellor officials or 
extension agents to rural villages. 
 In the most of case, the village project was selected through voting among village 
members with the town council held. Ri-jang, representative figure of village and  
administrative supporter to the local government office introduced and explained about 
community projects after going through “Ri-dong 6  Development Committee”. Village 
???????????????????????????????????????????
3 Base on author’s interview with Former Prime Minister Goh, Kun (November 24th, 2011) 
4 It is called “Cooperative project”.
5 Villages are classified based on regional characteristics such as mountain village, semi-mountain 
village, plain village, coast village and island.  
6 Korea’s administrative units under the county level
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residents discussed the priority of projects and made decisions on which projects should be
undertaken first, how to allocate resources, responsibilities, and roles. Such process 
reinforced participation of all stakeholders in decision-making over the allocation of public 
resources and the design of projects as well as in monitoring projects. 
 According to the annual reports of Saemaul Undong published by Ministry of Home 
Affairs in 19747, Saemaul project operation is divided into three parts: village infrastructure 
development, agricultural infrastructure development, and public facilities construction for 
income generation. In early days of Saemaul Undong the priority was given to the village 
infrastructure development such as the construction of village roads and housing 
improvement. In 1974, agricultural infrastructure development projects accounted for two 
third of total number of Saemaul projects. 
 As a result of Saemaul projects in 19738, for example, a 17,630-kilometer road was 
constructed and 480 thousand households made over the roof of house. The length of river 
and sewage arrangement was 5,161 km. Electricity was supplied to 308 thousand households 
and public telephone was installed in 700 spots. More than 17,455 of public facilities such as 
town hall, storehouse, and day care center were constructed in each village. In addition to 
environmental improvement projects, successful achievement of agriculture-related projects 
to increase agricultural productivity is reported. Agricultural water management was 
improved by arranging small reservoirs, dikes, water ways, etc. which reach to 5,393 cases. 
The number of agricultural machines including the cultivator, weeding machine, chemical 
sprayer, threshing machine, and so on increased to 36 thousand machines. Total 24,000 ha of
farmland was irrigated. The total output from Saemaul project operation in 1973 increased 
12-13 percentage point compared to the level of 1972.  
???????????????????????????????????????????
7 Ministry of Home Affairs (1974) 
8 Ministry of Home Affairs (1974) 
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 The government set the annual target as well as the mid- and long-term development 
plan. According to the long-term target until 1980 (Table 1), village infrastructure projects 
and agricultural infrastructure projects such as expansion and construction of village roads, 
farm roads, bridges, reservoir, waterways, and sewage system exceeded the targets whereas 
construction of facilities related to income generation activities shows the low level of 
achievement. Production activities at the village level were not successfully performed in that 
village projects such as construction of storehouse, workplace, or shed was achieved 64 
percent, 18 percent, and 14 percent respectively.  
 In order to successfully implement village projects, the government introduced the 
rewarding scheme that supports first to the village which shows the outstanding progress on 
village projects. Villages are categorized by three levels based on the degree of progress on 
village projects, such as “Self-reliant village”, “Self-help village”, and “Basic village”. Once 
the village is evaluated as “Self-reliant village”, the village is privileged in conducting village 
projects with more material supports in a higher priority. The government supported the 
outstanding villages not based on efficiency but competition and discriminatory mechanism.  
 In particular, rural electrification was powered in conjunction with the performance 
of Saemaul projects and achieved almost 100 percent of electrification by 1978 throughout 
the country. Electricity was supplied first only to outstanding villages evaluated in Saemaul
projects even though the selective provision of electricity is not economically feasible and 
efficient9. Despite the doubled cost, the government avoided the free rider problem by 
excluding the provision of electricity to the neighbor village that showed low performance 
but might be benefited by the provision of electricity to high-performing neighbor village 
(Figure 1). The strict result-based scheme accelerated the community development once the 
???????????????????????????????????????????
9 Based on author’s interview with Former Secretary to President for Saemaul Han, Ho-Sun served 
from 1972 to 1979 (September 6th, 2012) 
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tangible achievement of neighbor villages such as the supply of electricity was appeared in 
reality.   
1.2.2 Resource mobilization in community project operation 
The resources for community development projects are twofold: government supports and 
people’s donation (Table 2). Fiscal supports from the government sector were provided in the 
form of grants and loans from central and local government. During 1971-79, total cost of 
Saemaul projects is about 2.75 trillion won and 49 percent of project cost was funded by 
village residents by average. In fact, in 1970 the government secured the budget and 
mobilized 3 trillion won10 to finance Saemaul projects. For example, among the total cost of 
98.4 billion won for Saemaul projects in 197311, 39.7 billion won which accounts for 41 
percent of the total cost was supported by the government while 56.6 billion won, 57 percent 
of the total cost was financed by village people. 
 Village people participated to projects mostly through three channels: cash offer or 
payment in-kind, donation of land, and provision of labor force. The biggest part of village 
people’s participation came from the provision of their labor force. Village residents were
systematically engaged in infrastructure construction projects and provided their labor with 
and without compensation. When they got compensated they donated some portion of 
compensation for village projects. The participation of village residents in the form of 
donation of physical capital and labor force strengthened ownership and self-help efforts for 
community development projects. It is the unique and salient feature of Saemaul Undong in 
that community development programs rely solely on the government support in many 
developing countries. 
???????????????????????????????????????????
10 Kim (2006) 
11 Ministry of Home Affairs (1974) 
- 8 -
Ri-jang and village leader played a key role to call people together and coordinate 
village issues. In order to conduct village projects such as construction of town hall, village 
access road, farm road and land reclamation, some residents should donate not only their 
labor and time but also their land to communal projects. In early days of community projects 
village people were reluctant to readily donate their property, especially land, which is the 
most invaluable asset in rural areas.  
When villages planned to expand farm roads, for example, the land should be 
secured first. The government recommended expanding farm roads as a priority because road 
expansion facilitates the use of agricultural machines such as tractors and motors and it 
results in increasing labor productivity by saving labor hours. Furthermore, it reduces 
transportation costs of agricultural inputs and outputs by improving the distribution of 
agricultural products. Therefore, village people favorably participated in village projects 
because most of village projects did coincide with farmers’ interests. 
 The village leaders have taken the initiative and set an example of donation while Ri-
jang have kept communicating with village residents and persuading them to donate for the 
mutual benefit of projects in the future by using family ties and associational network across 
the village. The first project in most of villages was to construct a town hall. In general, the 
village leaders donated the building site in the middle of village. The pioneering endeavors 
from leadership brought out the higher participation of other village members. 
 The diary of Shin Kwon-shik, who served as Ri-jang during 1973-76 in Pyungtak, 
Kyunggi-do describes such difficulties in mobilizing resources and managing Saemaul 
projects12: 
???????????????????????????????????????????
12 This part borrowed heavily from Kim (2012). 
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Every day there are as many opinions as the number of village residents in
conducting Saemaul projects. Fights broke out as usual between villagers in 
making decision whether to put anggo (?) first or to install the drainage 
behind Insung’s house… it is hard to manage village issues… In the middle 
of town meeting about the construction of farming road, [he] did not want to 
donate his land and blamed me. He appeared again and looked drunk, and 
suddenly hit me with a hoe… I felt painful and started to bleed from ears…
(Kim, 2012) 
 Shin suffered severe brain damage that he could be convalesced after undergoing the 
brain surgery twice in Seoul. Nevertheless, he blocked the police to investigate the case and 
tried to protect the attacker. Shin as a village leader wanted to protect the community and his 
old neighbor. Accordingly, the attacker felt sorry and got to donate his land in the end. The 
village could successfully accomplish the construction of farming road. Despite difficulties in 
donating land and labor, conflicts were resolved with the dedicated efforts of Saemaul leaders 
under the name of ‘village work’.  
 The benevolent behavior from the village leader brought the goodwill and trust 
among village people. The trust accrued from the reciprocity in that village people started to 
help each other in the expectation that others will help me out in the future based on trust. 
Such trust within a community avoided opportunistic behaviors, reduced transaction costs, 
and facilitated the cooperation and participation in conducting village-level infrastructure 
development projects. Once the village projects started to produce tangible results and 
benefits for village residents, spontaneous cooperation and voluntary participation was just 
employed by social capital.  
1.2.3 Agricultural productivity and social capital 
Rice yield was dramatically increased in the 1970s. The average rice yield is 333 kg per 10a 
in 1971 and it reaches its peak, 488 kg per 10a in 197713, almost a 50 percent increase in rice 
???????????????????????????????????????????
13 Data source: KOSIS (Korea Statistical Information Service) 
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yield (Figure 2) within only 6 years. The growth in rice production is largely due to the Green 
Revolution which started in 1971 when the modern high-yielding variety (HYV) called 
Tongil was introduced. By 1974 the area of Tongil variety planted exceeded one fourth of 
total rice planted area and the average production of Tongil variety per 10a is 473 kg while 
average production per 10a of ordinary rice variety, 353 kg (Figure 3)14. Agricultural 
extension agents from farm village counsellor office under the local government disseminate 
new agricultural techniques and guideline by visiting individual farmers. 
 In addition to the adoption of new technology, the growth of agricultural productivity 
is closely related to Saemaul Undong in that most of projects in early days of the initiative 
focused on building agricultural infrastructure such as reservoirs, dike, water ways, drainage, 
river arrangement, pumping station, farm road, conduit, and so on. Along with Saemaul 
projects at a village level, “Agricultural Development Corporation” was established in 1970 
in accordance with “Agricultural Community Modernization Promotion Act15” to promote 
agricultural productivity through the construction of large-scale agricultural production base 
including dam, irrigation, land consolidation, etc.
 Rice yields are responsive to modern inputs such as agricultural machinery, chemical 
fertilizer, and pesticides as well as traditional inputs such as water and farm population. The 
utilization of chemical fertilizers was widely expanded by building fertilizer factories. In the 
mid-1970s, the self-sufficiency rate of fertilizer exceeded 100 percent. In addition, the 
government unified the supply channel of fertilizer to “Agricultural Cooperatives” and 
distributed at lower prices than market prices. In the case of pesticide, even though the 
amount of consumption varies from year to year because the demand of pesticide is related to 
weather condition, blight, and insect attacks, the production of pesticide continued to increase. 
???????????????????????????????????????????
14 Shin et al. (1976) 
15 Act No. 2199, January 12, 1970  
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The amount of production in 1975 was more than triple of that in 1970 (Table 5).  
 As farm population started to decrease since 1968 due to the rural exodus to urban 
industrial sector, labor shortage in agricultural sector accelerated around the mid-1970s. The 
government specified “Agricultural Mechanization Plan” in 1971 in order to increase the use 
of agricultural machinery, and thus, develop commercialized farming. Agricultural machine 
was rapidly supplied through “Agricultural Cooperatives” backed by government with long-
term loans at lower interest rates. In the case of tractor, less than 1 percent of total farm 
household had a tractor in 1970, however, 14 percent of the total possessed. The number of 
tractor increased approximately 30 times in a decade (Table 6).  
 In addition to modern and traditional inputs, agricultural productivity is sensitive to 
the third input “social capital” as well. Social capital employed by doing community-level 
projects together during the 1970s facilitated cooperation and participatory mechanism by 
reducing transaction costs. The close ties through clan, neighbor, and community provided 
solidarity and trust that requires promoting communal projects in the expectation of future 
benefit. The accumulation of social capital through relations among village people increased 
the returns to agricultural production. Although the community development program was the 
government’s initiatives to improve farm income, voluntary participation of farmers and 
residents was the key to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the projects.  
 This is in line with Putnam’s argument on social capital. Putnam (1993) defines as 
social capital “features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can 
improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions.” He explains that the 
differences in the economic performance between northern and southern regions of Italy are 
corresponded by the differences of social capital. Putnam argues that societies embodied by 
higher levels of social capital experience more rapid economic development, and better 
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institutional performance as well. 
 Agreed with Putnam, some studies argue that social capital promotes economic 
growth (Greif, 1989; Narayan and Pritchett, 1996; and Knack and Keefer, 1997). Greif (1989) 
claims that “coalition,” an economic institution based on a reputation mechanism encouraged 
trust and reduced transaction costs associated with asymmetric information, and therefore, 
Mediterranean trade contributed to the economic growth of southern Europe in medieval 
times. Narayan and Pritchett (1996) use the survey to measure associational activity as a 
proxy of social capital in rural Tanzania. They find that the level of social capital measured 
by “associational membership” affects the level of household income. However, Knack and 
Keefer (1997) find that horizontal networks – as measured by membership in groups - are 
unrelated to trust and civic norms and to aggregate economic growth. Nevertheless, they find 
that trust and civic norms are stronger in nations with higher and more equal incomes, with 
good institutions. 
1.2.4 Measurement of social capital 
Social capital is commonly measured at a national level using the available macro indexes 
such as Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)16 or International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG)17 rates regarding social infrastructure and institutions while survey of individuals is 
mostly used to measure membership of association and level of trust and cooperation. 
 Knack and Keefer (1997) use the World Value Surveys from 29 market economies to 
create two measures of social capital, “Trust” and “Civic cooperation”. The first indicator of 
“Trust” is the percentage of respondents answering “most people can be trusted” (Knack and 
???????????????????????????????????????????
16 “Worldwide Governance Indicators”, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx
(assessed April 2014), The World Bank                         
17 “International Country Risk Guide”, https://www.prsgroup.com/about-us/our-two-
methodologies/icrg (accessed April 2014), The PRS Group 
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Keefer, 1997). The second indicator, the norm of “Civic cooperation”, is evaluated from 
responses to questions about individual’s behaviors which “can be justified or not” (Knack 
and Keefer, 1997). Hall and Jones (1999) measure the social infrastructure by combining two
indexes of government anti-diversion policies and trade openness.  
 Measuring social capital is so difficult, inaccurate, and problematic that may lead to 
the potential measurement errors. In particular, survey questions are ambiguous and general 
in a sense that the results depend on what respondents are thinking at the moment under their 
specific environment. In addition, selection bias may arise because the respondents to 
questionnaire are more likely to have different characteristics from non-respondents. Hence, 
this research measures the proxy for social capital in a quantitative approach in contrast to 
most of researches which use survey questionnaires by asking qualitative questions. 
 The proxy to measure social capital in Korea’s rural region is village people’s share 
in total project cost at the community level. Here, “people’s share” is defined as village 
residents’ donation of land, money, and labor which are computed in a monetary value. Since 
participatory mechanism of society based on trust and social ties within the limited and 
shared space are more likely to vary by village, they are more likely to explain the differences 
by regions in productivity growth. The proxy variable for social capital accumulated by doing 
agriculture-related project j at county i in year t defines: 
???????????????? ?
? ?????????
? ?????????
where TC denotes total village project cost and PD is village people’s donation in common 
community development projects. 
 One thing to note here is that the proxy for social capital is rather endogenous in that 
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it has the reverse causality with (initial) level of output which also determines environment 
and nature of the society. The following equation summarizes the determinants of social 
capital: 
???????????????? ? ?? ? ?? ?? ??? ? ?????? ? ?? ? ?? ? ???
where ??? is the level of yield at county i in time t and ???? is a vector of other explanatory 
variables such as kinship tie which is not directly correlated to growth of yield. Interpersonal 
trust based on blood ties is a significant factor in making decisions of participation and 
donation to village projects in rural communities. The time-invariant unobserved 
characteristics ?? and the year effect ?? will be captured. The idiosyncratic error term is 
expressed as ???.  
1.2.5 Endogeneity of social capital: kinship, village networks and governance  
Putnam (1993) suggests that dense horizontal networks reinforce trust and civic norms. 
Knack and Keefer (1997) find, however, that horizontal networks – as measured by 
membership in groups - are unrelated to trust and civic norms and to aggregate economic 
growth. Instead, they find that social capital is associated with independence of courts, 
income inequality, ethnic homogeneity, and number of students in law. How could social 
capital be generated in low-income rural communities in Korea? 
 Social capital in Korea’s rural communities is endogenous in that family and kinship 
ties within villages are closely associated with people’s attitudes towards participatory 
mechanism in community projects. In fact, some village members admit that in the early days 
of initiative they reluctantly donated the land because they could not refuse requests from the 
leader who was their relatives or old neighbors at the same time. Once some of pioneers 
donated their assets for the public use, information flowed freely within a small village, and 
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other village members followed to participate due to the peer pressure. The family networks 
and ties enforce and monitor the community projects. 
 In addition to personal ties, participatory village governance is related to the 
accumulation of social capital. Horizontally organized groups of village people such as youth 
group (4-H), farmers’ and women’s association filled the margin created from the vertically 
delivered policies from the central and local government. Saemaul leader and Ri-jang are the 
channel to link between two in that they closely cooperated with the local government and 
agricultural extension officials from farm village counsellor office by delivering government 
policies to village people while representing the village’s interests to the government at the 
same time. 
 Unlike the conventional idea that the old generation was in the middle of decision-
making process on village projects in rural areas, the young generation was the major driving 
force. According to a survey18 of 106 villages regarding Saemaul leader and Ri-jang, average 
age of Saemaul leader is 39 and leaders aged between 31 and 40 represented 48 percent of the 
total. Regarding their academic background, 58 percent of Saemaul leaders graduated from 
middle school or higher level of education. Compared to the situation of rural areas during 
the 1970s, they were quite educated. 76 percent of leaders were born in the same village and 
the rest of them were from other village. Around 71 percent, a new figure became a village 
leader along with Saemaul initiative. The village leadership had been transitioned in that the 
young and educated started to emerge as new leadership in traditional rural community. 
 Kim (2009) also defines same characteristics of village leaders as aforementioned 
survey results based on statements from village people. According to her research the leader 
and Ri-jang who were actively engaged in rural community development can be 
???????????????????????????????????????????
18 See “Monthly report, August”, published by Ministry of Home Affairs (1974) 
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distinguished by some common factors: young, educated, experienced but having failed. 
They were around 40s and experienced the military or more advanced regions than their 
home town. They were exposed to the secondary or higher education in cities but finally 
came back to their home town.  
In fact, Saemaul leader and Ri-jang were major driving forces in completing 
community projects. Based on the survey of 106 villages19, more than half of village residents 
point out that the biggest contribution to the successful project outcome was made by village 
leaders. 24 among 100 leaders volunteered to take the leadership so that they wanted to 
dedicate themselves for the prosperity of their home town20. 76 leaders were selected to 
become a leader through the recommendation of township office because they had been 
passionately engaged in village issues. 
 The diary21 written by Shin, Kwon-shik, who served as Ri-jang during 1973-76 in 
Pyungtak, Kyunggi-do narrates his daily work as an administrative assistant to the local 
government as well as a village leader for community projects. He recorded that he was so 
busy in dealing with village works that he could not even farm his own land at all. The basic 
duties of Ri-jang are to conduct the village administrative work, facilitate Saemaul projects, 
purchase and distribute farming materials including fertilizers and plastic, and so on. Also 
they received mandates to participate in local government’s events and get trainings. 
 Along with the young and energetic village leaders, 4-H Club22, another youth group 
???????????????????????????????????????????
19 See “Monthly report, August”, published by the Ministry of Home Affairs (1974).
20 Ri-jang received 5,000 won per month in compensation for the village work. It is too small to give 
them any incentive to take the position. In addition, once taken the role leaders had to participate in 
many events and donations. Leaders could dedicate and passionate in doing village works without 
monetary compensation because of the commendation from the government and high 
acknowledgement from the society.  
21 Kim (2009) 
22 Originating in the early 1900’s as “four-square education” in the U.S. the 4-H’s (head-heart-hands-
health) seek to promote positive youth development, facilitate learning and engage youth in the work 
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beginning at age 13 up to the age of 29 actively engaged in Saemaul projects. After the 
military service, young generation usually joined the 4-H Club and got trained for rural 
development. In fact, most of Saemaul leaders had been engaged and received the leadership 
training in 4-H Club when they were adolescents. Thus, Saemaul leaders could easily 
facilitate the collective action through the youth group and mobilize the youth labor force in 
conjunction with 4-H Club in proceeding village projects. 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of their community through the Cooperative Extension Service to enhance the quality of life. 4-H
Club was organized at the village and school level in 1947 under Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
in Korea. It changed the name of organization as Saemaul 4-H Club in 1972, Saemaul 4-H Supporters 
in 1979, and Korea 4-H Supporters in 1988.   
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1.3 Empirical strategy  
1.3.1 Model 
Using a simple cross-section regression framework, the growth rate of yield in county i is 
determined by social capital and other variables as 
?? ? ? ? ? ?? ???? ? ???? ? ???? ? ??.
Here ?? is the growth rate of rice yield and ??? is a proxy for social capital. Proxy for 
social capital is a composite value which considers a different type of projects implemented 
in each village. Initial condition of wealth presented by rice yield, ????, is controlled in 
order to verify the convergence that the yield growth rate tends to be inversely related to the 
starting level of output or income as presented by Solow (1956), Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1992), and MRW (1992). The sign of coefficient ? is expected to be negative and those of 
all other variables are to be positive. 
 The vector of other explanatory variables ??? considers the land and labor saving 
technology such as consumption of chemical fertilizer and pesticide for paddy rice production, 
pesticide, and agricultural power machine. All values are adjusted by the cultivated area. In 
addition, other forces which reflect village networks and information delivery mechanism are 
summarized; i) membership of learning organizations including Agriculture Improvement 
Club (AIC), 4-H Club, and Farmland Improvement Association (FLIA); ii) number of 
Saemaul leaders who completed Saemaul training program; and iii) number of agricultural 
extension workers. Numbers are normalized by 1,000 farm population. Except the proxy for 
social capital and growth rate of farm population, all explanatory variables are in logarithm. 
?? is a random error term.  
Assume that the measure of social capital is exogenous and free from simultaneous 
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causality. Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator is employed to estimate the effects of social 
capital on the growth of agricultural production at a county level. Robust standard errors will 
be reported. 
1.3.2 Data  
Data across 149 administrative counties (gun) over 7 provinces23 from 1971 to 1977 are used 
to analyze the determinants of agricultural productivity. Averages over 7 year periods for each 
variable are calculated in order to observe the regional difference of agricultural growth 
pattern. Table 7 provides descriptive statistics of sample data across 149 counties. 
The proxy for the key policy variable “social capital” comes mainly from Statistical 
Yearbook published by the local government at a province level except Kyungsangbuk-do 
province. In general, Statistical Yearbook contains three or four village projects such as roof 
improvement, land consolidation, expansion of farm roads, and small river arrangement, and 
describes total project cost, amount of government support, amount of residents’ payment, 
number of projects, and number of participants to project under each project classification by 
county.  
 Other variables which may affect agricultural productivity are supplemented from 
Statistical Yearbook of Province and Statistical Yearbook on Agriculture, and Statistical 
Yearbook on Crops. It contains county-level data on the rice production, rice cultivated area, 
farm population, agricultural machinery, consumption of fertilizer and pesticide, national 
government employees in farm village counsellor office and so on. Variables related to 
agriculture such as rice production, fertilizer, pesticide, and machine are adjusted by the rice 
cultivated area because the farm size itself significantly matters for production. The number 
???????????????????????????????????????????
23 Gangwon (19), Kyunggi (22), Kyungnam (26), Kyungbuk (28), Geonnam (26), Geonbuk (16), 
Chungbuk (12) 
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of agricultural extension worker is adjusted by farm population.  
Some stylized facts are observed in sample data. First, Figure 4-1 shows that growth 
rates of paddy rice yield vary across counties. The histogram illustrates the number of 
counties over 7 provinces that lie in various ranges for the growth rate of rice yield from 1971 
to 1977. For 149 counties, the mean growth rate of rice yield is 5.4 per year and the standard 
deviation is 2.9. The highest growth rate is 17.9 (Sokcho) and the lowest is -0.9 (Jinju).
Second, Figure 5-1 shows that the variation of proxy for social capital in composite value 
across 147 counties ranges from 6.3 to 81.4 with mean of 39.7. Total rice production (kg) per
10a continuously rises from 335 kg in 1971 to 494 kg in 1977. The pattern of increase in rice 
yield applies to the pattern of social capital accumulation (Figure 6-1).
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1.4 Results 
1.4.1 Main results 
Table 10 provides the OLS regression results in comparison with four different measures of
proxy for social capital as variables of interest. The specifications which control the proxy for 
social capital, initial condition, membership of learning organizations and number of leaders 
trained in Saemaul program explains almost 56 to 67 percent of cross-county variation in 
growth rate of output over 95 to 145 counties from 7 provinces in 1971-77.  
The first proxy for social capital is a composite value which sums up a different type 
of village projects such as roof improvement, land consolidation, expansion of farm roads, 
and small river arrangement. Other three proxies are measured by an individual community 
project. All estimated coefficients of four proxies for social capital on growth rate of yield in 
specification (1) to (4) are positive and statistically significant (Table 10, Figure 7-1, 7-2, 7-3, 
7-4). 
The estimated coefficient of the proxy for social capital on growth rate of yield in the 
specification (1) is 0.0403 (s.e. = 0.0116). Figure 7-1 plots partial relation between growth 
rate of yield and the proxy for social capital, ceteris paribus. The coefficient predicts that a 
difference of 1 percent in the proxy of social capital is associated with a difference in growth 
rate of yield of 0.0403. The results are largely robust to different systems which add more 
control variables such as membership of learning organization and number of trained 
Saemaul leaders.  
The estimated coefficient of number of trained Saemaul leaders on growth rate of 
yield in the specification (5) is 1.224 (s.e. = 0.349) while the estimated coefficient of number 
of membership of FLIA is 1.942 (s.e. = 0.442). Farmers obtain information on the modern 
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variety and new agricultural techniques by participating in various kinds of village 
organizations including FLIA, AIC and 4-H Club. These organizations have affected farmers’ 
behavioral changes towards the decision of technology adoption and participatory mechanism. 
The estimated coefficients of membership of learning organization and number of trained 
Saemaul leaders are largely positive, but it is not robust to all systems. 
The initial condition which is the natural logarithm of paddy rice yield for 1971 is 
controlled to verify the convergence. The estimated coefficients range from -9.85 to -17.72 
and show the strong statistical significance in all systems. The empirical results confirm that 
counties with a lower initial endowment grow faster when other explanatory variables are 
controlled as Barro (1991) and Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) suggested (Figure 8). 
1.4.2 Robustness check 
Data across 28 administrative counties (gun)24 of Kyungsangbuk-do province from 1971 to 
197625 are used to analyze the determinants of agricultural productivity. In most cases, 
averages over 6 year periods for variables are considered. Table 8 provides descriptive 
statistics of sample data across 28 counties. 
The proxy for the key policy variable “social capital” comes from the output of 
“Saemaul Undong”constructed by University of Sungkonghoe (2008). This publication 
provides almost yearly time series on 26 different types of Saemaul projects by county in 
Kyungsangbuk-do, Korea’s south-east province and describes total project cost, amount of 
government support, amount of residents’ payment, number of projects, and number of 
participants to project under each project classification.  
???????????????????????????????????????????
24 “Ulleung-gun” is excluded in empirical analysis due to its regional characteristics, island.  
25 The period of sample data overlaps with the onset of the Green Revolution when new high-yielding 
variety called Tongil first became introduced. In 1973, yield of Tongil reached its peak. Since data for 
Tongil in Kyungsangbuk-do is available only for 1973, I fail to control the effect of new variety on the 
growth rate of per capita yield. 
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 There are 26 community-level projects regarding village infrastructure development, 
agricultural infrastructure development, and public facilities construction for income 
generation. In the empirical analysis, only 9 agriculture-related projects were selected: 
construction of small reservoirs, dike, water ways, and small river arrangement, pumping 
station, farm road, conduit, and so on (Table 9). A composite value for Saemaul projects is 
computed by summing the 9 projects values to see overall agriculture related projects’ output.
 Average number of total participants to community projects is 30,523 and average 
total project cost is about 90,083 thousand won. About 68 percent of total cost is financed by 
village people’s donation including labor wage, land donation, and cash or in-kind payment. 
Measure of social capital is calculated using people’s donation as a share of total project cost. 
It varies from 34 to 84 percent (Figure 5-2), where higher shares are assumed to be higher 
social capital accumulation. 
 Other variables which may affect agricultural productivity are supplemented from 
Statistical Yearbook of Kyungsangbuk-do. It contains county-level data on the rice production, 
rice cultivated area, farm population, agricultural machinery, consumption of fertilizer and 
pesticide, national government employees in farm village counsellor office and so on. 
Variables related to agriculture such as rice production, fertilizer, pesticide, and machine are 
adjusted by the rice cultivated area because the farm size itself significantly matters 
forproduction. The number of agricultural extension worker is adjusted by farm population.  
 Some stylized facts are observed in sample data. First, Figure 4-2 shows that growth 
rates of per capita rice yield vary across counties. The histogram illustrates the number of 
counties in Kyungsangbuk-do that lie in various ranges for the growth rate of per capita rice 
yield from 1971 to 1976. For the 28 counties, the mean growth rate of per capita yield is 6.8 
per year and the standard deviation is 2.85. The highest growth rate is 13.98 (Gimcheon) and 
the lowest is 0.37 (Daegu). Second, total rice production (kg) per 10a continuously rises from 
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320 kg in 1971 to 400 kg in 1976. Third, farm population rapidly decreased and moved to 
urban industrial sector.  
 For 28 counties, the relation between the growth rate of per capita yield from 1971 to 
1976 and the log of per capita yield in 1971 is negative and close to zero. Also, it is 
statistically insignificant. As Figure 10-1 shows, cross-county data in Kyungsangbuk-do
province provide little evidence of absolute convergence. 
 Table 11 shows the OLS regression results in Kyungsangbuk-do province. The 
specification which controls three different kinds of capital explains almost 60 to 75 percent 
of cross-county variation in growth rate of output per capita. 
The estimated coefficient of the proxy for social capital on growth rate of per capita 
yield in the specification (2) is 5.729 (s.e. = 2.640). Figure 11 plots partial relation between 
growth rate of per capita yield and the proxy for social capital, ceteris paribus. The coefficient 
predicts that a difference of 1 percent in the proxy of social capital is associated with a 
difference in growth rate of per capita yield of 0.057. In fact, counties with a higher social 
capital such as Wolsung, Sangju, and Uljin grow faster. Counties that are close to a lower 
social capital are Andong, Kyungju, and Gunwi and all three show slower growth rate of per 
capita yield ranged from 3 to 5.5 percent, which are below the mean growth rate of per capita 
yield, 6.8.  
As a proxy for human capital variable, the number of agricultural extension workers 
adjusted by the number of farm population is used in regression analysis (2). The estimated 
coefficient of the logarithm of it is positive and statistically significant: 26.66 (s.e. = 7.394, 
Figure 12). It is worth to note that the magnitude of the coefficient is huge in a sense that 0.3 
percent of increase in growth rate of per capita yield is resulted from a 1 percent increase in 
number of agricultural extension workers per farm household. In fact, government focused on 
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diffusion of new agricultural technology including modern high-yielding varieties and 
disseminated informative agricultural techniques and skill in order to improve farm 
household income during the 1970s. Extension workers visited each farmer in village and 
farm and shared the knowledge and technology. As a result, Korea could achieve self-
sufficiency of rice in 1977. 
The variable of initial condition is the natural logarithm of per capita rice yield for 
1971. In the system (5), the estimated coefficient, -11.95 (s.e. = 2.961), supports the 
conditional convergence that has been shown in various conventional studies such as Barro 
(1991) and Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992). Compared to Figure 10-1, Figure 10-2, the 
partial regression plot, describes stronger negative correlation and clear convergence with 
other factors held constant.  
Three physical capitals such as chemical fertilizer, pesticide, and agricultural 
machinery are included as a logarithm separately. The estimated coefficient of all three land 
and labor saving technology shows statistical insignificance. This result is somewhat 
unexpected in that the use of chemical fertilizer and machine increases agricultural 
productivity. During the observation period, the production and consumption of chemical 
fertilizer increased by 1.6 times along with the dissemination of modern variety Tongil.
- 26 -
1.5 Conclusion 
This chapter attempts to endogenize the productivity growth through behavioral changes of 
village people in the face of comprehensive community development initiative in the 1970s. 
As I know this is the first attempt which empirically verifies the idea that social capital 
accumulated by doing collective coordination and cooperative work enhanced the growth of 
agricultural productivity. The adoption of new agricultural technology, of course, is the key 
factor to the remarkable increase in agricultural production. 
I tried to focus on the mechanism of social capital accumulation in the historical 
context and story in rural villages. In the 1970s, village infrastructure projects such as an 
irrigation, land consolidation, and expansion of farm roads enhanced the level of social 
capital because village people are forced to interact each other by doing community project 
together.  
The modified cross-section growth regression shows that social capital generated by 
doing the community-level infrastructure development projects increases the growth rate of 
agricultural output. Results are largely robust after controlling other explanatory variables 
including membership of learning organization, number of extension workers, number of 
trained Saemaul leaders, physical capital, etc. Counties grow faster because they accumulated 
the higher level of social capital which facilitates the implementation of community projects 
based on trust and cooperation by reducing transaction costs. Once the tangible results and 
economic benefits from village projects appeared in reality, the accumulation of social capital 
is accelerated.   
 Nonetheless, there are some limitations on this research. It is obvious that the 
introduction of modern high-yielding variety Tongil significantly increased the paddy rice 
yield, but I failed to control due to the lack of data availability. In addition, the proxy for 
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social capital is rather endogenous and not free from simultaneity bias because the social 
capital is affected by growth of productivity as well the environment of society.  
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Table 1. Progress on Saemaul Projects 
Village Project Unit Long-term goal as of 1971(A) 
Result 
as of 1980 (B)
Achievement 
B/A (%)
Expansion of village roads km 26,266 43,558 166
Farm roads km 49,167 61,797 126
Small bridge one 76,749 79,516 104
Town hall dong 35,608 37,012 104
Store house dong 34,665 22,143 64
Workplace one 34,665 6,263 18
Shed one 32,729 4,476 14
Reservoirs one 10,122 13,327 132
Dammed pool one 22,787 31,625 139
Waterway km 4,043 5,161 128
River arrangement km 17,239 9,677 56
Housing improvement thousand dong 544 225 42
Town improvement one 1,529 843 55
Portable water supply one 32,624 28,130 86
Sewage system km 8,654 15,559 179
Electricity thousand hh 2,834 2,777.5 98
Phone dong 18,633 18,633 100
Saemaul factory one 950 717 75
Source: 30 Year History of Saemaul Undong by Korea Saemaul Undong Center (2000)
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Table 2. Resource mobilization in Saemaul projects (hundred million) 
Year Total(A + B)
Government support Village residents' 
payment (B)Total 
(A)
Central 
government
Local 
government Loans
1971 122 41 27 14 - 81 66 %
1972 313 33 20 13 - 280 89 %
1973 984 215 125 90 - 769 78 %
1974 1,328 308 121 173 14 1,020 77 %
1975 2,959 1,653 666 579 408 1,306 44 %
1976 3,226 1,651 484 396 771 1,575 48 %
1977 4,665 2,460 599 723 1,138 2,205 47 %
1978 6,342 3,384 654 773 1,957 2,958 47 %
1979 7,582 4,252 1,258 1,010 1,984 3,330 44 %
Total 27,521 13,997 3,954 3,771 6,272 13,524 49 %
Source: 10 Year History of Saemaul Undong by the Ministry of Home Affairs (1980)
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Table 3. Production of fertilizer (m/t) 
Year Nitrogen fertilizer Phosphatic fertilizer Potassium fertilizer Total
1960 6,228 -? -? 6,228
1965 75,271 -? -? 75,271
1970 400,553 139,543 49,745 589,841
1971 408,001 144,676 46,785 599,462
1972 418,193 162,569 54,506 635,268
1973 447,255 159,292 65,172 671,719
1974 514,061 166,195 69,750 750,006
1975 582,740 195,475 81,509 859,724
1976 534546 214,780 83,831 833,157
1977 668844 309,310 110,796 1,088,950
1978 788540 420,912 120,686 1,330,138
1979 837788 487,788 111,854 1,437,430
1980 729413 493,558 106,762 1,329,733
Source: Statistical Yearbook by the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (1981) 
Table 4. Consumption of fertilizer (thousand m/t, %) 
Year
Nitrogen fertilizer Phosphatic fertilizer Potassium fertilizer Total
Quantity Ratio Quantity Ratio Quantity Ratio Quantity Ratio
1962 191 64.3 90 30.4 16 5.3 297 100
1965 218 55.4 123 31.4 52 13.2 393 100
1970 356 63.2 124 22.1 83 14.7 563 100
1975 481 54.3 238 26.8 167 18.9 886 100
1976 361 56.2 142 22.1 140 21.7 643 100
1977 388 52.7 210 28.6 138 18.7 736 100
1978 461 53.3 231 26.6 174 20.1 866 100
1979 444 51.5 227 26.3 192 22.2 863 100
1980 448 54.1 196 23.7 184 22.2 828 100
1981 432 52 199 24 199 24 830 100
Source: 20 Year History of Agricultural Cooperatives by the National Agricultural Cooperative 
Federation (1985) 
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Table 5. Production of pesticide (m/t) 
Year Germicide Insecticide Herbicide etc. Total
1970 10,677 9,456 5,889 313 26,335
1971 3,437 12,906 8,798 389 25,530
1972 4,461 18,088 10,438 318 33,305
1973 6,176 31,445 14,406 653 52,680
1974 4,983 30,757 18,089 490 54,319
1975 12,823 49,773 25,508 656 88,760
Source: Statistical Yearbook by the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (1976) 
Table 6. Supply of agricultural machinery  
Year Cultivator Duster Iron sprayer Water pump Thresher Total26
1972 6,060 1,964 15,517 2,067 848 26,485
1973 7,736 1,850 15,500 2,927 1,350 29,394
1974 25,243 6,274 15,625 3,991 4,673 56,035
1975 27,970 8,013 17,859 3,718 5,288 64,005
1976 41,933 9,476 20,949 13,671 6,025 92,429
1977 41,387 11,478 27,476 14,476 6,110 103,689
1978 45,316 10,191 35,231 17,291 5,740 119,101
1979 53,534 12,068 44,897 9,717 6,023 137,453
Source: KOSIS 
???????????????????????????????????????????
26 The total number of agricultural machines includes tractor, transplanter, sowing machine, harvester, 
cutter and dryer as well as above appeared. 
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Table 7. County-level sample descriptive statistics, 7 provinces total, 1971-77 
Variables Obs Mean Std.dev. Min Max
Id by county 149 75 43.157 1 149
Agriculture
Growth rate of farm population 148 -2.003 4.854 -10.151 28.015
Growth rate of rice yield, 1971-77 148 5.357 2.987 -0.923 17.979
Rice yield, 1971 (kg/10a) 149 327.168 37.529 154.000 385.000
Fertilizer per 10a (kg/10a) 105 253.274 587.955 3.234 2253.489
Pesticide per 10a (kg/10a) 73 1819.328 3607.441 45.739 12797.210
Power machine (unit/hh) 121 0.503 0.415 0.058 2.012
Learning organization
No of AIC per 1000 farm pop 149 2.355 0.876 0.516 5.261
No of AIC member per 1000 farm pop 149 31.028 13.786 7.388 76.184
No of AIC leader per 1000 farm pop 149 2.585 1.094 0.520 6.146
No of 4H per 1000 farm pop 149 4.610 4.436 0.776 20.479
No of 4H member per 1000 farm pop 149 82.897 77.883 15.160 389.945
No of 4H leader per 1000 farm pop 149 10.343 10.344 1.929 46.041
Saemaul leader
Trained leader per 1000 pop, total 121 0.900 0.695 0 4.246
Trained leader per 1000 pop, male 121 0.487 0.356 0 2.184
Trained leader per 1000 pop, female 121 0.244 0.347 0 1.920
Trained leader per 1000 pop, NACF 121 0.170 0.072 0 0.379
Extension service
Extension worker 47 1.378 1.162 0.376 4.256
Proxy for social capital
Proxy 1 in composite value (%) 147 39.690 18.087 6.337 81.381
Proxy 2 in roof arrangement (%) 79 53.168 28.904 6.337 87.884
Proxy 3 in land consolidation (%) 78 23.609 6.323 16.486 65.736
Proxy 4 in farm road (%) 37 63.228 15.607 26.756 92.258
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Table 8. County-level sample descriptive statistics, Kyungsangbuk-do, 1971-76 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Agriculture
Average yield per capita (kg/10a), 1971-76 28 0.0085 0.011 0.0021 0.0414
Yield per capita (kg/10a), 1971 28 0.007 0.0091 0.0014 0.0363
Rice cultivated area (ha) 28 6958.4 4399.34 354.42 18207.6
Farm household 28 14556.2 7653.88 1554.33 31152.0
Farm population 28 83127.8 43690.9 9032.5 177194.7
Farm population, 20 < age < 50 28 26903.6 13652.3 3388.8 54804.0
Fertilizer (m/t/ha) 22 76.24 26.82 35.2 169.35
Pesticide (kg/ha) 28 678.08 96.7 542.7 882.21
Agricultural machinery (per household/ha) 28 5.3 2.0 2.0 11.8
Extension worker (per farm population) 28 0.00053 0.00022 0.00036 0.0012
Saemaul projects
Total cost of village project (A) (1000 KRW) 25 90082.7 66489.3 3964.4 291188
Government support (1000 KRW) 25 23596.2 14718.8 2900.4 57351
Village people's donation (B) (1000 KRW) 25 66416.08 53437.4 1492.57 237191
B/A (%) 25 67.89 13.23 33.89 83.77
Participants 24 30522.69 22672.55 277.6 90506.6
Table 9. Agriculture infrastructure projects, Kyungsangbuk-do, 1971-76 
Projects Participants Government support
People's 
donation (A)
Total cost 
(B)
Participation
(A/B)
Farm roads 22822.68 5642.05 29736.68 35106.54 79.86
Waterway 3419.91 1447.94 3939.1 5375.99 73.27
Reservoir 1717.21 1786.17 3123.26 4858.39 65.04
Dammed pool 1173.72 816.59 2010.85 2731.68 72.14
River arrangement 5563.26 2535.05 6303.86 8626.84 71.11
Source: Statistics on Saemaul in the 1970s by Sungkonghoe University (2008) 
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Figure 1. Merit-based provision of electricity27
???????????????????????????????????????????
27 Author’s visualization based on Han, Ho-Sun’s statement
- 40 -
Figure 2. Yield of paddy rice (kg/10a), 1965 - 1979 
Source: Year book of Agriculture and Forestry Statistics by Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (various 
volumes)  
Figure 3. Yield of Tong-il versus Traditional variety, 1971-75 
Source: Green Revolution in Korea by Ministry of Finance and Strategy (2012) 
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Figure 4-1. Growth rate of rice yield, total 149 counties, 1971-77 
Figure 4-2. Growth rate of per capita rice yield, Kyungsangbuk-do, 1971-76
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Figure 5-1. Proxy for social capital (%), total 147 counties, 1971-77 
Figure 5-2. Proxy for social capital (%), Kyungsangbuk-do, 1971-76 
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Figure 6-1. Social capital (%) and paddy rice yield (kg/10a), total, 1971-77  
Source: Author’s calculation based on Statistical Yearbook of Provinces (various volumes) 
Figure 6-2. Social capital (%) and paddy rice yield (kg/10a), Kyungsang-do, 1971-77  
Source: Author’s calculation based on Statistical Yearbook of Provinces (various volumes) 
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Figure 7-1. Growth rate of yield versus proxy for social capital in composite value, total 146 
counties 
Figure 7-2. Growth rate of yield versus proxy for social capital in roof arrangement, total 79 
counties 
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Figure 7-3. Growth rate of yield versus proxy for social capital in land consolidation, total 78 counties 
Figure 7-4. Growth rate of yield versus proxy for social capital in farm land, total 37 counties 
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Figure 8. Growth rate of yield versus level of initial rice yield, total 146 counties 
Figure 9. Growth rate of yield versus other variables, total 145 counties 
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Figure 10-1. Growth rate of per capita yield 
versus level of per capital initial rice yield, 
Kyungsangbuk-do
Figure 11. Growth rate of per capita yield 
versus proxy for social capital,
Kyungsangbuk-do
Figure 10-2. Growth rate of per capita yield 
versus level of per capita yield,  
Kyungsangbuk-do
Figure 12. Growth rate of per capita yield 
versus log of Extension, Kyungsangbuk-do 
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Chapter 2 
Profitability, Learning, and Technology Diffusion 
2.1 Introduction  
Technology adoption is fundamental to the growth of agricultural productivity. With appropriate 
technology adoption and diffusion, Asian countries such as Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines 
experienced the dramatic increases in yield of rice and wheat varieties from the late 1960s, as 
known as the Green Revolution.  
Rice production had been chronically short to meet the domestic consumption of Korea. 
The situation was worse than ever in the aftermath of the Korean War from 1950 to 1953 due to 
the destruction of production infrastructures. Korea imported massive amount of rice that by
1971, $206 million worth was imported. It accounted for one fifth of total export amount of $1 
billion. Hence, the government set the goal to achieve self-sufficiency of food to save foreign 
exchange amid rapid industrialization during 1960s. 
The continuous effort for technology development contributed to achieve self-
sufficiency of rice when the modern high-yielding variety (HYV) named “Tongil” was widely 
diffused and cultivated in the late 1970s. The effort to increase agricultural productivity was 
initiated by government-supported agricultural research and extension services since the early 
1950s. With public-supported technology development, the growth of agricultural productivity 
could be made possible during the 1970s.  
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Although the government made effort to develop and diffuse new technology the 
adoption of agricultural technology resulted mainly from an individual farmer’s decision to plant 
the modern variety. Unlike the conventional idea that farmers compulsively complied with 
government policy and adopted the Tongil because the government forced them to cultivate it, 
farmers were independent decision-makers to adopt the modern variety. Farmers made decisions 
to choose between continuing to plant the traditional variety and starting to cultivate the modern 
variety considering the economic profit from adopting it.  
It was not easy for an individual farmer to adopt a new technology because it is costly to 
take it. Farmers faced uncertain returns against economic costs and often suffered from credit 
constraints in rural poor areas. In addition, information on the new technology was so limited 
that learning the new technology from others is an essential process in the technology adoption.      
This chapter aims at identifying whether the profitability guaranteed by the government 
and knowledge spillovers through learning organizations and extension services contributed to 
the adoption and diffusion of the modern HYV of Tongil. The fixed effect (FE) estimator is 
employed to estimate unbiased effect of observable variables which might be correlated with 
unobserved region-specific characteristics. The idea that learning through the government 
extension services and village-based learning organizations contributes to adopt the new 
technology is largely robust to both county- and province-level analyses.     
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2.2 Background of Korea’s technology adoption and diffusion  
2.2.1 Pattern of technology diffusion  
The Green Revolution of Korea was not a random event and development of the high-yielding 
variety. It was a constant process of technology improvement through government-supported 
agricultural research and extension services since the early 1950s. The effort to increase 
agricultural productivity was initiated by institutional changes along with the “First Five-Year 
Development Plan for Expansion of Agricultural Production” in 1953. The main goal was to 
achieve food self-sufficiency through the supply of agricultural inputs, land reclamation, and 
research and extension service for increasing production. 
Agricultural technology development was further systematized and strengthened by the 
establishment of the Rural Development Administration28 (RDA) in 1962. The research and 
development of modern varieties was strongly promoted by the RDA in collaboration with the 
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines. As a result of public-supported 
effort of research and development, the high-yielding variety named Tongil (IR66729) was 
introduced in 1971. Spread of Tongil variety30 throughout the country was rapidly reached at an 
equilibrium level in a short time. By 1978, as much as 76 percent of the total paddy rice area was 
cultivated with Tongil variety (Figure 1). Although a rapid diffusion of Tongil was temporarily 
interrupted by natural calamities in 1972, the diffusion rebounded with a much higher yield 
which was almost 30 percent more than that of traditional rice variety in 1973. 
???????????????????????????????????????????
28 The “Rural Development Law (1962)” denotes the missions of RDA: to contribute to improve the 
welfare of farmers by conducting agricultural research and development, agricultural technology transfer, 
and capacity building for farmers and rural leaders. 
29 IR667 is a hybrid rice variety from the cross of three different types of variety: IR8, Yukara, and TN1
(Taichung Native 1).  
30 There are more than 20 modern high yielding varieties such as Yushin, Nopung, Raekyung, Milyang,
etc. The modern variety refers to Tongil variety, hereafter.  
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Diffusion pattern of Tongil variety has been featured by geographic differences, as 
represented in the case of hybrid corn in the United States31. The hybrid corn has been spread 
rapidly since the early 1930s and it showed marked geographic differences in the development 
(Griliches, 1957)32. In addition, some regions adopted Tongil variety earlier than others, and 
some regions made the transition much more rapidly than others. Some regions reached lower 
levels of equilibrium than others by the late 1970s. However, almost everywhere the general 
pattern of diffusion of Tongil variety followed an S-shaped growth curve like the pattern of 
diffusion of hybrid corn (Figure 2-1, Figure 2-2). 
The speed of adoption and diffusion of Tongil variety was slow at first and was 
accelerated during the transition period. In the early stage of the diffusion process, in fact, the 
new technology of Tongil variety was imperfect, then the effort to improve seeds, tastes, and 
cultivation techniques has been continuously made throughout the whole process. When the 
technology has been enhanced after the initial stage, the diffusion speed of Tongil variety was 
rapid. The growth rate slowed down as the technology diffusion was completed in 1978.  
The distribution of rice yields shows the close correlation with the distribution of rates of 
acceptance of Tongil variety: The higher the yield, the higher the rate of acceptance of the new 
technology. The production amount of Tongil variety accounts for 80 percent of the total amount 
of rice production in 1978 (Figure 3).  
The pattern of technology diffusion also applies to increase in the use of other inputs 
including irrigation condition, farm equipment, fertilizer, pesticide, etc. Modern high-yielding 
variety of Tongil is characterized by a higher yield with a higher level application of chemical 
???????????????????????????????????????????
31 See Griliches (1957). 
32 Studies regarding the diffusion of new technology in economics began with Griliches (1957) in his 
seminal study on the diffusion of hybrid corn. 
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fertilizer. Since lack of irrigation had been pointed out as a critical problem of low agricultural 
productivity of Korea, the construction of irrigation system was a prerequisite to apply fertilizer. 
As the irrigated field was expanded, more rapid diffusion and higher yield of the modern variety 
were expected (Figure 4).   
2.2.2 Profitability of HYVs production  
Adoption of high-risk modern variety requires strong incentive or guarantee for the expected 
yield. Despite the heavy public-supported propagation of the Tongil variety, it was not easy for 
farmers to decide to abandon the traditional variety. Uncertainty about yields of the modern 
variety was a main reason why farmers did not adopt it immediately considering the fact that the 
majority of farmers were small holders engaged in subsistence farming. In 1971, more than 65 
percent33 of total farm households owned less than 1 ha and the poorer farmers have suffered 
from credit constraints due to the heavy household debt from high-interest loans34 since the 
1950s.  
 The production cost of Tongil variety is higher than that of traditional variety, 
particularly, because of higher material costs created by purchasing more inputs such as chemical 
fertilizers, pesticides, polyethylene film sheets and so on. In spite of higher input costs in 
cultivating Tongil variety, the Tongil variety could not command higher market prices because it 
was not preferred by consumers35. Korean people have been accustomed to sticky and sweet 
tastes of traditional Japonica-type rice. Although the yield of Tongil variety is much higher than 
???????????????????????????????????????????
33 Author’s calculation based on Statistical Yearbook on Agriculture
34 See Lee, Myung-Hwi (2009). 
35 According to the survey in 1972 with 100 farmers of sample, however, 84 farmers answered the taste 
of Tongil is “good” and other 16 farmers responded “bad”. All sample farmers wanted to the quality of 
Tongil to be improved not to get the lower price than that of the traditional variety in the market (Yu and 
Ban, 1973). 
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that of traditional variety by 30 percent, it did not results in economic profit due to higher input 
costs and lower market price in reality36.  
 Correspondingly, the government intervened into the market and filled the gap between 
the quantity demanded in reality and quantity supplied by increase in production of modern 
variety through price and input subsidies37. The monopoly purchase of Tongil variety and 
monopoly sale of chemical fertilizers through the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation 
(NACF) worked as a mechanism to induce farmers to cultivate the modern variety through 
higher rice prices and lower inputs prices than equilibrium prices38. The government facilitated 
the supply of other complementary inputs such as pesticides and polyethylene film sheet in a
timely manner. Seeds were provided by the government as well.  
For farmers, therefore, there was no financial barrier to adopt the Tongil variety. 
Revenue from the adoption was guaranteed while the cost from the adoption was only the 
opportunity cost of labor and land that were no longer committed to the traditional variety. The 
presence of strong effort from the government and the necessary financial support increased the 
capacity to absorb new technology and make use of a new innovation in a shorter term. 
???????????????????????????????????????????
36 There are several financial analyses which calculate costs and revenues in planting the HYV Tongil
compared to the traditional variety (Shin et al., 1976; Yu and Ban, 1973; Shim, 1974). Shin et al. 
calculated that the net income in cultivating the HVY is 6,605 KRW higher than that of farm household 
with the traditional variety in 1974 while Yu and Ban demonstrated that the difference of net income 
between the HYV and traditional variety is 14,474 KRW in 1972. According to the calculation from Shim, 
the profit per 10a caused by cultivating Tongil variety compared to traditional variety is 6,000 KRW 
higher (May 22, 1974, Chosun il-bo).
37 According to the survey conducted by Yu and Ban in 1972, among 100 farmers 89 farmers responded 
that they wanted to plant the HYV because the Government purchases it while 11 farmers cultivate the 
HYV for family consumption. Surprisingly, no farmers wanted to plant Tongil variety for the purpose of 
selling in the open market. In fact, Government sale, family consumption, and sale on the open market 
accounted for 49.5 percent, 20.5 percent, and 4.9 percent respectively of the HYV on the surveyed farms 
(Yu and Ban, 1973). 
38 In 1975, the government set the rice price per 80 kg at 19,500 KRW which had been increased by 23.7 
percent and planned monopolized purchase of 7 million sum. The rice purchasing price was determined 
based on increasing farm production costs and inflation rate of 20 percent for the sake of diffusion of 
Tongil variety (November 3, Donga il-bo).
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 The government started to award the high-yielding farmers with 100 thousand won39
from 1973 to encourage the cultivation of Tongil variety. Not only farmers but also extension 
agencies and local governments were awarded by increase in production. Interestingly, high-
yielding farmers were, in general, small holding farmers who possessed less than 1 ha40. Unlike 
the conventional idea that the poorer farmers are less likely to adopt the new technology because 
of credit constraints, and therefore, they are more likely to risk averse, small subsistent farmers, 
in fact, adopted more the Tongil variety and actively responded to new opportunity created by 
technology changes. Their profit-seeking interests and desires to become wealthier were exactly 
matched by the government policy in the 1970s amid rapid industrialization. 
 However, heavy financial supports including price subsidies, agricultural loans, and 
awards have burdened the government with financial deficits. The government had maintained 
the high rice price policy since 1968. As the diffusion speed of modern variety was much more 
rapid than expected, financial deficits were largely created in the middle of the 1970s41. The 
government responded to deficits by encouraging rice consumption since 1977 in order to reduce 
expenditures in holding rice inventory.  
The Green Revolution of Korea was successfully completed within a shorter period in 
that required public goods such as agricultural research, extension services, and infrastructure 
were suitably provided with huge financial supports from the government. Although it was not a 
sustainable measure, the government effort to achieve rice self-sufficiency and the balanced 
growth between rural and urban areas was worthy of compliment considering that exploitation of 
???????????????????????????????????????????
39 It is equivalent to the price of a cow in 1973.  
40 Annual Report on Rural Extension Service, 1976 
41 The accumulated deficit by supplying chemical fertilizers at a cheaper price is 42.4 billion KRW by 
1973. It is expected to reach 193.2 billion KRW by the end of 1976. In order to eliminate the deficit, price 
of fertilizers should be increased by 172 percent at least (December 20, 1975, Maeil Business Newspaper).
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agriculture to promote industrialization was rather universal to many developing countries 
(Anderson and Hayami, 1986). 
2.2.3 Information-sharing: learning organizations and extension services 
It took no more than a decade to successfully complete the Green Revolution in Korea. The 
continuous effort to achieve self-sufficiency of rice resulted in success because of effective 
technology diffusion through village organizations and heavy extension services. Farmers 
obtained information on the modern variety and new agricultural techniques by engaging in 
various kinds of village organizations which have served as a channel for information-sharing. 
The organizations have affected farmers’ behavioral changes towards the decision of technology 
adoption42.
 Village organizations could be largely divided into three types: learning organizations, 
associations, and cooperatives. By 1971, a total of 77,89543 learning organizations including 4-H
Club, Agricultural Improvement Club, and Home Economic Club had been organized and efforts 
were underway to provide a systematic opportunity to increase knowledge and skills of their 
members. By the end of the 1978 when the Green Revolution was completed, the number of 
learning organizations has nearly doubled and reached 134,36244.
 The youth aged from 13 to 24 joined 4-H45 and they have learned the latest agricultural 
???????????????????????????????????????????
42 The U.S. Military Government during the post-war established the Agriculture Improvement Institute 
in 1947 and educated Korean people to cultivate unconventional crops in order to resolve food shortage 
through 4-H. Therefore, one of main activities of 4-H was the introduction of new agricultural techniques 
such as introduction, cultivation, and preservation of Canada potato (Kyunggi Association of 4-H Club, 
1949). 
43 Author’s calculation extracted from Statistical Yearbook on Agriculture
44 Author’s calculation extracted from Statistical Yearbook on Agriculture
45 It has been a conventional perspective from historians and sociologists that learning organizations in 
rural communities had represented and followed the government policy since the 1950s. Rhee Syngman 
government utilized Credit Cooperatives and Korea Farmers Association to culture the physical and 
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techniques. Contrast to traditional varieties, the modern HYV is a ‘semi-dwarf’ which has short 
stems for sustaining more grain yields while the yield of Tongil responds to a higher level of 
fertilizers with an unconventional application methods 46 . Therefore, proper rice-breeding 
techniques for modern variety have been introduced and exchanged between members of 
learning organizations to keep novices up-to-dated. 
 As a result of information sharing and effective knowledge spillover through 4-H, many 
members have been awarded in that they harvested the highest yield of the year in the country. In 
fact, more than half of farmers awarded for the highest yield of the year were the members of 4-
H Club (Ahn, 1986). Even female members47 were awarded and actively participated in learning 
process through organizations.   
 Male members of 4-H have become members of Agricultural Improvement Club when 
they were over the age of 24 after the completion of their military services while female 
members belonged to Home Economic Club automatically. During the development era from the 
1960s to 80s, in fact, all of individual in rural areas were exposed to the high opportunity of 
learning and education via compulsory primary education, learning organizations, military 
services, associations, and cooperatives throughout their whole life. These organizations on each 
community provided a means whereby individuals enable to increase their capability and learn 
cooperation through teamwork during the transition period faced by rapid technology changes.  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
ideological foundation (Lee, 1998) while Park Chunghee government utilized Agriculture Cooperatives to 
mobilize rural society (Han, 1998). The 4-H has been also regarded as one of government-supported 
organizations for the political sakes. However, 4-H had a clear vision and mission and especially played 
an important role in delivering new agricultural techniques and knowledge. 
46 For example, farmers used to prefer to apply nitrogenous fertilizers and it resulted in soil acidification, 
and therefore, autumn declining phenomenon was frequently observed. The 4-H publicized to utilize 
calcium fertilizers which are more suitable to Korean geographical feature with acid soils. It contributed 
to improve soil quality as well.  
47 Kim, Hee-Nam, 22 years-old female member of 4-H from Gangneung, Gangwon province was 
awarded by the high yielding of Tongil variety with the record of the production of 670 kg per 10a 
(Annual Report on Rural Extension Service, 1973). 
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 Learning organizations based on traditional village boundary closely have worked with 
the government extension agency. The history of extension work has been started by the 
foundation of Agriculture Improvement Institute (AII) in 1957 followed by the recommendation 
of the ‘U.S. Macy report’ published in 1956 regarding strategy of Korea’s agricultural 
development48. Besides, institutional infrastructure for the extension service has been equipped 
with the creation of the RDA as an independent government organization in the early 1960s. 
With institutional set up for extension services, the nationwide effort for increasing agricultural 
production with the diffusion of modern HYV has been initiated along with the community-
driven development with the Saemaul Undong since the early 1970s.   
 Extension services controlled by the RDA have delivered the on-the-job training and 
assigned the group work for 4-H members to build capacity as professional farmers. In 1973, 80 
members who were selected all across country have studied new agricultural techniques in the 
United States for two years with fully sponsored by the RDA49.  
 As a means of dissemination of the modern variety, the RDA undertook the 
demonstration program which installed the demonstration complex for collective farming of 
Tongil variety and delivered new scientific rice breeding techniques. As a result, the Tongil
variety showed higher yielding than that of traditional variety did in the neighbor plot by 40 to 
50 percent50. It was 55 percent increase in yield compared to the previous year’s yield from the 
same plot (Table 1). Meanwhile, the RDA provided training sessions on the operation of 
???????????????????????????????????????????
48  The International Cooperation Administration (ICA) started to provide a longer-term technical 
assistance rather than a one-shot and fragmented assistance in the late 1950s. Community Development 
Program in the 1960s is in line with the ICA’s policy and it became the foundation for the Saemaul 
Undong in the 1970s.   
49 Annual Report on Rural Extension Service, 1974 
50 The yield of Tongil variety per 10a in demonstration plots is 537 kg on average. Compared to the 
production of traditional variety of 371 kg in neighbor plots, yield has been improved by 45 percent 
(Annual Report on Rural Extension Service, 1973). 
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agricultural machines to farmers by setting up 100 training centers at the county level51.
Responding to labor shortage due to rural exodus, the RDA introduced the mechanized labor-
saving technology along with “Agricultural Mechanization Promotion Act”. 
 Under the RDA as a control tower, more than 7,000 extension workers from 9 province-
level and hundreds of county-level extension service agencies visited farmers, figured out 
problems, and transferred techniques and recommendations based on region-specific 
environment and characteristics. The dialectic interaction between farmers and extension 
workers was highly effective because farmers’ demand and trouble in cultivating the modern 
variety were reported immediately to the central authority. At the same time, the feedback from 
the research and development was delivered to farmers in a timely manner. Extension system in 
the 1970s largely contributed to increasing agricultural productivity in that three components 
connecting R&D, extension agencies, and farmers are closely related and collaborated.    
2.2.4 Risk-sharing: social capital and rural sociology 
With the profitability secured by the government’s policy, Tongil variety has been spread rapidly 
throughout the farm belt of Jeonnam province and the rest of the country. While huge subsidies 
for inputs and rice prices were major incentives for small holding farmers to adopt a high-risk 
but high-yielding modern variety, social capital accelerated the diffusion of new technology 
through risk-sharing accrued by trust and cooperation among farmers.  
 As noted earlier, social capital accumulated by doing village projects together increased 
agricultural productivity in rural Korea in the 1970s. Furthermore, social capital also played a 
role as a catalyst for the adoption and diffusion of new technology. Social capital induced by 
???????????????????????????????????????????
51 32,885 farmers completed trainings on use and fix of agricultural machines (Annual Report on Rural 
Extension Service, 1973). 
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doing Saemaul Undong based on principles of self-help and cooperation helped the modern 
variety to be disseminated rapidly. Simultaneously, village people have participated more 
actively in village projects in providing their labor and capital in that they were able to better off 
because of increase in income by selling extra rice production occurred by the appropriability of 
the new agricultural technology. The diffusion of the modern variety have commoved with the 
accumulation of social capital (Figure 5).  
 One of the characteristics of Tongil variety is higher yield potential to more fertilizer 
application. In order to efficiently apply chemical fertilizers, the water should be controlled first 
considering the fact that more than half of paddy field in Korea in 1971 was not irrigated paddy 
fields. Therefore, water management was identified as an urgent issue in adopting Tongil variety. 
The agricultural infrastructures as well as water control systems including reservoirs, dikes, and 
water ways were improved through Saemaul projects along with the diffusion of Tongil variety. 
Among agricultural infrastructure projects, for example, land consolidation has been 
considered a priority in increasing agricultural productivity and funded by the government as 
well as farm household since the 1960s. Along with land consolidation, farm roads have been 
newly constructed or expanded, and thus, it resulted in greater access to the outside by vehicles 
and the higher efficiency in agricultural work. Therefore, once the government had sponsored the 
land consolidation, the village people accordingly responded and donated their land and labor. 
Land consolidation was one of the prerequisites in rapid diffusion of the Tongil variety. 
This is in line with Aoyagi et al. (2014). They study the mechanism of social capital 
accumulation using artefactual field experiments of trust game and find that communal physical 
infrastructure such as an irrigation system enhances the level of social capital because people are 
physically built-in the irrigation infrastructure system and thus people are forced to interact each 
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other institutionally (Aoyagi et al., 2014). The maintenance and productive use of the irrigation 
system require regular cleaning of the canals, necessitating collective coordination and 
cooperative work among community members (Aoki, 2001; Hayami and Godo, 2005).  
 New cultivation techniques have developed along with the introduction of Tongil. It 
encouraged the accumulation of social capital in that more group work and collaboration with 
individual farmer were required when the modernized agricultural methods were introduced. For 
example, unlike traditional variety, Japonica, it was fundamental for Tongil variety, which is a 
hybrid rice of traditional variety and tropical variety of Indica, to secure a longer cultivation 
period. The early planting cultivation method, which is raising seeds covered with polyethylene 
film52 sheet, allowed earlier seedling by preventing cold injury. With this technique, a group of 
farmers should work together and collaborate as a team to install seedbeds covered with 
polyethylene film in a timely manner. Farmers were able to overcome the small subsistent 
farming by working together. 
 Correspondingly, the risk of shirking was minimized because farmers were forced to 
work together in the farm while working as a member of groups in constructing public goods in 
communities. Farmers are able to reduce the risk involved in the adoption of Tongil variety 
through cooperation and trust accumulated by doing co-work. 
???????????????????????????????????????????
52 Since 1970 mass polyethylene film production system has been developed due to the construction of 
the petrochemical complex in Ulsan. Since then, polyethylene film was supplied at a lower price to 
farmers.  
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2.3 Empirical strategy 
2.3.1 Model 
To identify whether profitability and knowledge spillovers through learning organizations and 
extension services contributed to the adoption and diffusion of the modern HYV of Tongil, the 
fixed effect (FE) estimator is employed. The FE estimator is used to estimate unbiased effect of 
observable variables which might be correlated with unobserved region-specific characteristics. 
Unobservable factors are related to geography, local people’s political orientation, weather, etc. 
In addition, the government-supported effort for Green Revolution in disseminating the HYV 
implies that the bias is likely to be practically generated.  
 The estimates are obtained from a fixed effect model which removes time-constant, 
unobserved attributes ??: 
??? ? ? ? ????????? ? ??????????? ? ????? ? ?????? ? ???
where ???, outcome variable, denotes the percentage of planted area of the HYV to the total 
planted area of paddy rice in province/county i at year t. The explanatory variable of interest, 
?????????? is the membership of learning organizations including 4-H Club and Agriculture 
Improvement Club as well as extension workers in province/county i at year t. Other explanatory 
variable, ????????, is the previous year’s yield difference between the high yielding variety 
(HYV) and traditional variety (TV) of paddy rice. The yield difference is controlled to reflect the 
profitability of the new technology adoption. The difference of yield between the HYV and TV is 
???????? ? ???????????? ? ???????????
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The bigger the difference the more adoption of the modern variety is expected in the following 
year.  
This is because the farmer’s problem at time t in the region i is optimizing inputs usage 
to maximize the expected profit subject to credit constraints, 
?????? ?????? ? ??? ?????
?? ? ????
where ??? is a multiplier for technology diffusion such as learning organizations, extension 
services and rural networks and ?????is a vector of agricultural inputs while the production 
function ???????  is linearly homogeneous in all inputs. Prices of inputs and output are 
normalized to 1 in that there are no differences in prices by region. Farmer’s decision for the 
adoption of new technology is 
?? ? ??????????? ???????
?? ? ?????
? ? ??????????? ????????? ? ????
???? is the vector of regressors which include; i) a proxy for social capital accumulated 
by doing village projects53, ii) land and labor saving technologies including chemical fertilizers, 
agricultural power machines, and pesticides; iii) socioeconomic factors such as farmers 
characteristics of average age, pure farming, and small holding, and; iv) land condition including 
cultivated area of Farm Land Improvement Association (FLIA) and irrigated land. 
The estimate of interest is ?, the effect of learning on technology adoption and diffusion 
at an area i at time t, which is expected to be positive. Since the new technology of Tongil variety 
was introduced first through government sector intervention and neighbor farmer’s experiences, 
???????????????????????????????????????????
53 As pointed out in the earlier chapter, the proxy for social capital has endogeneity problems which 
might be related to unobservable area-specific attributes or other covariates. 
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the learning organizations at villages and extension workers became the channel for knowledge 
spillovers. It will be a small contribution to the literatures that utilize individual-level data to 
estimate the effect of learning from other neighbors. 
In addition, as the data of yield from the modern variety are only available at the province 
level from 1975 to 1978, the paddy rice yield and the cultivated area of the HYV of previous 
year are alternatively utilized in order to reflect the profitability and experience respectively. ??
denotes the area effect and ?? the year effect. ??? is a random error. Each regression also 
contains a full set of year dummies.  
2.3.2 Data 
Data are constructed at province and county levels drawn from various sources54 from 1970 
through 1980. Main data at a province level come from the Statistics Yearbook of Agriculture55.
The strength of the Yearbooks is its all-inclusive information on the agriculture-related statistics 
as well as climate and demographic characteristics in 11 provinces in a consistent manner. 
Although individual farmer’s socioeconomic characteristics are not reported by this data set, it 
was able to be inferred by demographic figures classified by age groups, farm size, assets, and so 
on in a broader perspective. Some information from the Statistical Yearbook on Agriculture and 
Statistical Yearbook on Crops are matched to the main dataset. 
 One salient feature to use province-level data is that not only the yield of the traditional 
variety but also that of the HYV are reported so that the yield difference between two varieties 
are able to be controlled in a sense that the yield difference in previous year results in 
???????????????????????????????????????????
54 Statistical Yearbook of Province, Statistical Yearbook of County, Statistical Yearbook on Agriculture, 
Statistical Yearbook on Crops, Annual Report on Rural Extension Service, etc.  
55 Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery has published the yearbook of statistics. 
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profitability and it would motivate farmers to adopt the modern variety more or not to adopt. For 
inputs variables including chemical fertilizers, power machines, number of trained Saemaul
leaders, and number of members of learning organizations, all figures adjusted for farm area of 
10a are utilized. For socioeconomic variables based on farm size, percentage of farm households 
which hold less than 0.5 ha, 1 ha, and 2 ha are calculated. Only weakness in using the province-
level dataset is that I failed to include the yield difference between the HYV and TV in the early 
stage of technology adoption during 1971-74 because the data is not available.  
 However, data at a county-level provide information on the proxy for social capital other 
things being equal and supplement the provincial level analysis. County-level data mainly come 
from the Statistical Yearbook of Province which was utilized in the earlier chapter. But not every 
province is included. Data across 55 administrative counties (gun) of Kyungsangbuk-do and
Kyungsangnam-do provinces from 1970 through 1978 are estimated with the proxy for social 
capital. Proxy for social capital is measured by the same method as aforementioned in the earlier 
Chapter. People’s share defined as village residents’ donation of land, money, and labor which 
are computed in a monetary value compared to total project costs in doing village projects is 
calculated. 
Average three projects’ composite cost of Kyungsangnam-do is 351,333 thousand won. 
About 58 percent of total cost is financed by village people’s donation and it shows large 
variation from 17 to 100 percent among counties, where higher shares are implied to be higher 
social capital accumulation. One thing to be mentioned is that types of village projects are 
different between two provinces because different local governments had implemented village 
projects according to their own priority and methods.  
In the case of Kyungsangbuk-do, same proxy measured by using 9 different agriculture-
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related village projects as presented in the Chapter 1 was estimated while the composite value 
from 3 different village projects such as land consolidation, small-scale irrigation, and village 
beautification is utilized as a proxy for social capital of counties from Kyungsangnam-do.
Although the specific project type is distinct, the important features are common in that they are 
all agriculture-related village projects in which village people have participated. In addition, the 
method to measure the proxy of social capital is consistently applied.  
 Diffusion pattern of the modern variety Tongil at a county level is nearly matched by its 
province level diffusion pattern as aforementioned demonstration in Figure 2-1 (Figure 2-2). 
Regarding the pattern of Kyungsangnam-do, it shows a sharp reduction in 1973 due to the lower 
yields performance in 1972 when natural disasters such as hurricane, typhoon, and flood hugely 
affected people worldwide. However, higher yield performance of 1973 has boosted rapid 
diffusion of Tongil variety since 197456.  
 Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of key variables at a province level while the Table 
3 summarizes descriptive statistics of sample data across counties from both provinces.
???????????????????????????????????????????
56  Observation year is different between both provinces. Available data observation years of 
Kyungsangbuk-do are 1973 and 1975 through 1978 regarding the cultivated area of Tongil variety while 
the cultivated area of Tongil variety of Kyungsangnam-do are fully observed from 1971 through 1978. 
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2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Main results 
Table 4 provides estimation results on the effect of learning and profitability in adopting the 
modern variety at a province level from 1975 to 78. Data across 11 provinces are analyzed by the 
fixed effect (FE) model. The knowledge spillovers through learning organizations and extension 
services are estimated by the membership of 4-H Club and the number of extension workers 
which are adjusted by cultivated area.  
The number of extension workers is estimated to have a positive and significant effect 
on the cultivated area of the HYV in the FE model. It is inferred that the dialectic interaction 
regarding new agricultural technology between the individual farmer and extension worker was 
effective to the adoption and diffusion of the modern variety. The result also confirms that 
extension service under the RDA was successful to disseminate information and techniques 
through continuous R&D investment. The effect of learning organizations is estimated to be 
positive and statistically significant. The membership of 4-H Club adjusted by cultivated area is 
positively correlated with the percentage of adopted area of the HYV. Farmers responded to the 
knowledges from the other neighbor farmers in their information networks. 
The remarkable thing to note in Table 4 is that the specification is able to control the yield 
difference between the HYV and TV which reflects the profitability of the modern variety. The 
estimated coefficients are strongly positive and statistically significant, ranged from 11.07 to 
12.51. That is about 0.12 percent increase in the cultivated area of the HYV as an additional unit 
increase in the yield difference between two varieties. In fact, individual farmers decided to 
accept the modern variety not because of the government strong recommendation but because of 
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its profitability.  
2.4.2 Robustness checks 
Table 5 provides estimation results on the effect of learning and profitability in adopting the 
modern variety at a county level from 1971 to 78. Data on 55 counties from two southeast 
provinces of Kyungsangbuk-do and Kyungsangnam-do are utilized as sample observations.  
According to the estimated results of fixed effect (FE) model with unobserved region-
specific characteristics, the effects of the membership of learning organizations are estimated to 
be positive and statistically significant. In particular, the number of Agriculture Improvement 
Club (AIC), adjusted by cultivated area, is strongly correlated with the percentage of adopted 
area of the HYV. The result implies that learning organizations closely worked with the 
government extension agency and adopted new agricultural techniques. They served as a channel 
for information and knowledge sharing places between extension workers and individual farmers 
as well as among farmers. 
The important thing to note in estimation results is that coefficients on the previous year’s 
cultivated area of the HYV are largely robust. Furthermore, coefficients on the previous year’s 
paddy rice yield are positive and statistically significant in the system (2). These two variables 
are alternatively controlled in lieu of the variable of yield difference between the traditional and 
modern variety. The result strongly suggests that farmer’s cultivation experience of the modern 
variety positively correlates to the diffusion of the technology while the higher the yield of paddy 
rice the more likely it is that farmers adopt more modern variety in the following year because 
the yield of the HYV accounts for 80 percent of the yield of paddy rice in 1978. Once the 
adoption of the Tongil proved its high yielding attributes and it resulted in profitability to farmers, 
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the speed of diffusion process was accelerated.  
The proxy for social capital does not show the statistical significance on the adoption and 
diffusion of the new agricultural technology. Even though the social capital accumulated by 
doing village projects together encourages more rapid diffusion of cultivated area of Tongil 
variety as a catalyst, there was no direct effect on the adoption of new agricultural technology. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
The new high-yielding variety Tongil was rapidly adopted and diffused in the 1970s because of 
two: its profitability guaranteed by the government price subsidy and knowledge spillovers 
through social networks based on each village. Since the uncertainty in adopting the modern 
variety was eliminated by the monopoly purchase of Tongil variety and monopoly sale of inputs 
from the government, the farmers had no barriers to adopt it. Individual farmers adopted more 
the Tongil variety and actively responded to new opportunity from technology changes. Their 
profit-seeking interests and desires to become wealthier were exactly matched by the government 
policy in the 1970s amid rapid industrialization. 
 In addition, learning organizations such as 4-H Club and Agricultural Improvement Club
as well as associations and cooperatives provided a systematic opportunity to increase 
knowledge and skills regarding the new technology through social interaction based on 
community. These organizations on each community provided a means whereby individuals 
enable to increase their capability and learn cooperation through teamwork during the transition 
period faced by rapid technology changes. Learning organizations closely worked with the 
government extension agency. 
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Table 1. Outcome of the demonstration complex for collective farming of Tongil variety  
Source: Annual Report on Rural Extension Service by Rural Development Administration (1974) 
Province No. ofcomplex
Farm
household
Cultivated
area (ha)
Yield per 10a Increase
Year 
1973
(kg)
Before 
1973
(kg)
Neighbor 
land 
(kg)
Before 
1973
(%)
Neighbor 
land 
(%)
Seoul 1 11 4.7 552.0 310.0 358.0 178 154
Pusan 1 22 3.2 439.0 308.0 316.0 143 139
Kyunggi 140 2968 1173.3 523.7 347.6 382.5 151 137
Gangwon 40 718 232.7 525.2 303.2 349.3 173 150
Chungbuk 60 934 319.1 617.2 356.0 391.4 198 158
Chungnam 140 2055 720.2 547.6 364.9 388.9 150 141
Geonbuk 140 2029 700.0 529.7 353.5 375.3 150 141
Geonnam 172 3087 892.2 510.0 348.0 359.7 147 142
Kyungbuk 166 3700 883.3 577.5 331.2 355.4 174 163
Kyungnam 140 2928 700.0 503.7 343.4 358.6 147 141
Total 1000 18452 5628.7 536.7 346.1 370.7 155 145
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Table 2. Province-level sample descriptive statistics, 11 provinces total, 1970-78 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Id by province (si-do) 99 6 3.178 1 11
Total farm household 99 217714.600 148063.000 4324 466075
Cultivated area of paddy rice 99 108578.200 78901.870 696 207114.6
Cultivated area of traditional variety 55 62425.160 55443.080 495 160579.9
Cultivated area of high-yielding variety 84 34386.550 43602.410 0 186797.0
Percentage of cultivated area of HYV 83 24.764 25.515 0 93.16
Yield of paddy rice (kg per 10a) 99 370.849 71.610 160 552
Yield of traditional variety (kg per 10a) 55 387.382 58.180 265 652
Yield of high-yielding variety (kg per 10a) 52 478.769 64.773 291 610
Yield difference between TV and HYV 52 64.058 51.783 -64 260
Cultivated area by FLIA (ha) 83 33786.240 26629.340 39.600 91662.200
Irrigated area (ha) 88 56224.100 42720.630 365.900 139718.500
Percentage of small holder (< 1 ha) 88 63.249 8.393 46.740 84.107
Chemical fertilizer (kg per 10a) 88 27.379 67.173 3.473 404.971
Power machine per household 88 0.204 0.108 0.042 0.569
No of 4-H Club 88 3045.523 2230.881 35 7655
No of 4-H Club membership 88 53913.450 41701.510 580 174765
Extension worker 66 582.379 385.220 24 1239
Extension office 66 108.803 84.479 3 251
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Table 3. County-level sample descriptive statistics, 55 counties total, 1971-78 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Id by county (si-gun) 495 28 15.891 1 55
Cultivated area of paddy rice 488 6706.846 7288.454 45.6 138754
Cultivated area of HYV 316 2367.717 2833.889 0.3 18327.9
Percentage of cultivated area of HYV 316 35.595 29.037 0.125 100
Yield of paddy rice (kg per 10a) 405 349.783 47.256 203 498
Yield of HYV (kg per 10a) 78 487.628 57.643 341 613
No of Agriculture Improvement Club (per 10a) 375 0.0040 0.0061 0.0003 0.0526
No of 4-H Club (per 10a) 428 0.0038 0.0041 0.0002 0.0526
No of 4-H Club member (per 10a) 428 0.0673 0.0688 0.0025 0.8114
No of 4-H Club leader (per 10a) 428 0.0100 0.0137 0.0004 0.1908
Cultivated area by FLIA (ha) 302 1765.003 1885.798 21.5 11432.5
Irrigated area (ha) 344 3515.520 2449.955 0.300 11770.6
Chemical fertilizer (kg per 10a) 326 11.099 30.170 0.697 538.526
Power machine (no. per 10a) 346 5.221 4.744 0.112 42.057
Proxy for social capital 404 57.785 27.022 0 100
Percentage of small holder (< 0.5 ha) 309 39.125 13.194 13.207 83.189
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Table 4. Regression analysis for percentage of cultivated area of HYV at a province level 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Percentage of cultivated area, Fixed Effect
HYV, 1975-78 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Learning
Extension service 41.70*** 47.33*** 41.09*** 49.27***
(10.49) (8.787) (10.35) (10.59)
Membership of 4H 36.25** 41.57* 37.55* 30.85
(14.75) (19.61) (19.81) (22.99)
Profitability
Yield difference, HYV and TV 11.07** 11.65** 11.24*** 12.51***
(3.627) (4.455) (3.379) (2.672)
Land condition
Cultivated area of FLIA 0.380 0.420 0.386 0.516
(0.386) (0.436) (0.393) (0.322)
Small holder -0.664
(0.791)
Physical inputs
Chemical fertilizer 2.064 5.895
(14.99) (12.97)
Power machine 19.00
(24.87)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 37 37 37 37
Number of id_sido 11 11 11 11
Within R-squared 0.954 0.954 0.954 0.956
Between R-squared 0.187 0.193 0.184 0.294
Overall R-squared 0.005 0.001 0.004 0.017
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Figure 1. Percentage of planted area of HYV to total paddy rice field, total, 1971-78 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Year book of Agriculture and Forestry Statistics by Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries (various volumes) 
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Figure 2-1. Percentage of planted area of HYV to total paddy rice field by province, 1971-78 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Year book of Agriculture and Forestry Statistics by Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries (various volumes) 
Figure 2-2. Percentage of planted area of HYV by county, Kyungsang Provinces 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Statistical Yearbook of Province by Kyungsangbuk-do and
Kyungsangnam-do (various volumes) 
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Figure 3. Yield of traditional variety versus yield of HYV
Source: Year book of Agriculture and Forestry Statistics by Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 
(various volumes) 
Figure 4. Percentage of planted area of HYV versus percentage of area improved by irrigation 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Year book of Agriculture and Forestry Statistics by Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries (various volumes) 
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Figure 5. Social capital versus percentage of planted area of HYV by province  
Source: Author’s calculation based on Year book of Agriculture and Forestry Statistics and Statistical 
Yearbook of Province (various volumes) 
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Chapter 3 
Distributive Pattern of Government Grants in the 
Community Development Program 
3.1 Introduction 
Community development programs have tended to be one of top priorities in developing 
countries for an effective poverty reduction and sustainable development. The international 
development aid agencies and NGOs recognize that the community development approaches 
and actions are fundamental elements to build up self-help, mutual trust, neighborhood 
integration and capacities so as to encourage collective action in doing communal projects. 
The World Bank alone has invested about $85 billion over the last decade on development 
assistance to promote participatory development through community development projects 
and local decentralization (Mansuri and Rao, 2013). Involvement of communities in 
designing and implementing projects could help to achieve a higher level of cooperation and 
make government more accountable. 
 However, the successful cases of community development programs are rarely 
observed in practice because inducing civil society participation and leading to collective 
action require highly systematic efforts sustained over a longer period. Therefore, the demand 
for Korea’s successful experience of community development is rapidly growing across the 
world, especially from those countries which are in their take-off period. In fact, the model of 
Saemaul Undong is in top of demand lists submitted by beneficiary countries of the 
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Knowledge Sharing Program57 (KSP). When it comes to the issue of what the successful 
factors of Saemaul Undong are, however, it is rather difficult to generalize because 
community development should be a grassroots process by which communities: each has a
different context based on their own culture, tradition, members’ disposition, environmental 
condition, etc. 
That said, one salient feature that could apply universally to developing countries is 
the unique evaluation and support system of Saemaul Undong from the perspective of public 
administration. The Korean government classified rural villages into three categories based 
on the visible changes of the villages after the implementation of Saemaul projects and 
provided the preferential support to villages which showed the self-help efforts and 
improvement compared to the previous year. The performance-based support system is rather 
unique approach considering the fact that the political bias and corruption are rampant 
problems in allocating resources in developing countries. In addition, the performance-based 
supports reinforce the project outcome based on rigorous assessments. 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the mechanism that guided the allocations 
of development resources across villages along with the nation-wide community development 
program of Saemaul Undong. According to the anecdotal evidences from the Saemaul
practitioners58 in the 1970s, one of the widely-accepted ideas regarding the evaluation and 
support system is that the government provided the development resources only to the better-
performing and promoted villages compared to the previous year’s performance. So far, 
however, there is no empirical evidence that verifies the conventional idea that the 
government only supported villages which showed the remarkable changes after the 
???????????????????????????????????????????
57 The Korea Development Institute (KDI) has been implementing the Program since 2004. Until 
2013, KSP has been involved in research and consultations with 134 countries and 606 topics 
(http://www.ksp.go.kr/ksp/information.jsp).
58 I interviewed several practitioners of Saemaul Undong in the 1970s: Former Prime Minister Goh, 
Kun (November 24th, 2011), Former Secretary to President for Saemaul Han, Ho-Sun (September 6th,
2012), and Former President of Korea Saemaul Undong Center Lee, Jae-Chang (August 5th, 2014). 
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implementation of Saemaul projects. 
To identify whether the government distributed grants selectively to high-performing 
villages or randomly, three estimation methods including pooled OLS, random effects and 
fixed effects are employed. The most straightforward approach would be to match the name 
of each village categorized as “Basic”, “Self-help”, and “Self-reliant” with the name of 
villages awarded by government grants. Since the names of villages are not available,
however, I alternatively use the number of villages promoted to the higher levels and the 
number of grant-awarded villages. If both numbers are close to each other, then the 
government grants are distributed selectively only to better-performing villages. 
The empirical analysis is limited in one southern province of Korea because the 
performance indicators of villages are only appeared in the Statistical Yearbook of 
Kyungsangnam-do province at a county level. According to the regression results, it does not 
seem that the government provided the support only to the better-performing and promoted 
villages compared to the previous year’s performance. However, it does not necessarily mean 
that the government allocated development resources in an egalitarian manner or randomly.  
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3.2 Analysis of Saemaul evaluation system and government grants 
3.2.1 Evaluation and support system of Saemaul Undong
Performance-based evaluation and support system of the village performance on Saemaul
projects was one of contributing factors to enable remarkable development of rural villages 
through the provision of right incentives. The government classified rural villages into three 
categories based on the visible changes of the villages after the implementation of Saemaul
projects and provided the preferential support to villages (Table 1 and Table 2). The 
evaluation and support system was designed and intended to encourage competition among 
neighbor villages and stimulate villages lagged behind. 
Goh Kun59, Former Prime Minister of Korea, said that “One of the most challenging 
parts of the Saemaul Undong was the evaluation of the performance of rural villages”. In 
order to correctly assess the outcomes of Saemaul projects, central and local government 
officials frequently visited rural villages and cross-checked outcomes of the village projects. 
Hwang 60 (1980) indicates that it was possible to evaluate and categorize villages in 
accordance with the performance because of the government monitoring and evaluation 
package throughout all administration levels – village, county, district, and province. 
Vertically delivered administration system helped to provide materials and financial supports 
in a timely manner. Since the number of Saemaul villages reached more than 26,000 in its 
peak, the provision of materials itself was a challenging task for the government.
The government evaluated the performance of Saemaul projects mostly based on 
visual changes of villages. The government established criteria in evaluating and classifying 
villages that eight dimensions of outcome changes after Saemaul Project implementation 
???????????????????????????????????????????
59 He played the key role in planning and designing Saemaul projects as Director of the Saemaul
Bureau during 1971-75.   
60 See Hwang (1980).?
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were considered to categorize villages as “Basic”, “Self-help” and “Self-reliant” villages: 
village roads, farm roads, river arrangement, irrigation, agricultural machine, cooperative 
farming, village fund, and household income61 (Table 3).
The local government provided materials and guidelines for the next step tailored to 
the development status of villages. For the Basic villages, the lowest level in the development 
status among three levels, the government tried to encourage self-help spirits first among 
village members with simple projects implementation for the better living environmentwhile
focusing on the non-farming income generation activities for the Self-help villages. Once the 
villages reached the highest development stage of Self-reliant villages, the priority was to 
increase the social and cultural wellbeing of village members.
By early 1973, for example, the government classified villages based on the outcome 
of Saemaul projects in 1972. For 18,415 Basic villages, simple projects such as farmroads 
constructions and roof improvement projects were encouraged and supported by the 
government while for about 13,943 Self-help villages, the government supported high-cost 
projects such as electrification and construction of local amenities. For 2,307 Self-reliant 
villages, guidelines and support for doing business for the higher income generation were 
provided62.    
As noted in the earlier chapter, rural electrification was powered in conjunction with 
results of Saemaul projects and achieved almost 100 percent of electrification by 1978 
throughout the country. Electricity was supplied first only to outstanding villages evaluated in 
Saemaul projects even though the selective provision of electricity is not economically 
???????????????????????????????????????????
61 10 Year History of Saemaul Undong by the Ministry of Home Affairs, 1980 
62 Saemaul Undong: from the beginning to today by the Ministry of Home Affairs, 1973 
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feasible and efficient63. Despite doubled cost, the government tried to avoid the free rider 
problem by excluding the provision of electricity to the neighbor villages that showed low 
performance but might be benefited by the provision of electricity to outstanding neighbor 
villages (Figure 1 in Chapter 1). The strict merit-based scheme accelerated the community 
development once the tangible achievement of neighbor villages such as the supply of 
electricity was appeared in reality.  ?
Along with the supports with priority of orders, the government provided different 
amount of financial supports according to the development level of villlages. For example, 
the government supported 80 percent of total project cost for the Self-reliant village, on the 
other hand, only 60 percent and 50 percent of total cost were provided for the Self-help and 
Basic village, respectively64. It is essential not to unilaterally hand down development 
resources but to selectively distribute, while suggesting further guidelines customized to the 
peculiar development status of each village.
The government provided total grants of KRW 57,183 million for 39,932 villages 
from 1972 to 1979 (Table 2). The government grants were classified into Saemaul project 
grants, outstanding village grants, rivulet arrangement grants, electrification grants, special 
village grants, success case of village grants and simultaneous support grants from 1974 to 
197965 (Table 4). The type of grants varied by year, however, four types including Saemaul
project grants, outstanding village grants, rivulet arrangement grants, and electrification 
grants were provided relatively in a consistent manner. The number of grant awarded villages 
and the amount of the government grants reached its peak in 1976 (Table 2, Table 4, Figure 3
and Figure 4).
???????????????????????????????????????????
63 Based on author’s interview with Former Secretary to President for Saemaul Han, Ho-Sun served 
from 1972 to 1979 (September 6th, 2012) 
64 See the news article from Kyunghyang newspaper (November 13, 1973) 
65 Saemaul Undong: from the beginning to today by the Ministry of Home Affairs, 1974 - 1979 
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“Central Committee for Saemaul Undong” was set up to discuss implementation 
strategies and coordinate policies between central and local governments and among 
ministries. The Minister of Home Affairs was the president of the Committee while relevant 
Ministers participated and coordinated implementation policies as committee members. In 
addition, the “Saemaul Bureau” within the Ministry of Home Affairs was created in charge of 
planning and designing Saemaul projects as a control tower. The “Monthly Saemaul Meeting” 
attended by ministers, high ranking officials, local government officials, and village leaders 
was held to report the implementation status and review the strategy while troubleshooting 
bottlenecks faced by the implementation through immediate policy responses directly from 
the President.
3.2.2 Spatial diffusion of Self-reliant villages 
The government classified rural villages into three levels based on the development status: 
Basic villages, Self-help villages, and Self-reliant villages. In accordance with the 
development level of villages, different government supports and annual targets were 
provided regarding income increase, improvement of living environment, the development of 
a village fund to provide resources for future development projects, etc. In addition, villages 
were required to satisfy the specific criteria66 constructed by the government so as to be 
promoted to a higher level and to get more government supports with a priority (Table 3).  
In 1972, the number of Basic, Self-help, and Self-reliant villages are 18,415, 13,943, 
and 2,307, respectively among total 34,655 villages67 (Table 1). 16,250 villages which 
showed the outstanding performance in Saemaul projects of 1971 received 500 bags of 
???????????????????????????????????????????
66 Eight dimensions of outcome changes after Saemaul Project implementation are considered to 
promote villages to Self-help and Self-reliant villages: village roads, farm roads, rivulet arrangement, 
irrigation, farming base, cooperative life, village fund, and income projects. 
67 Saemaul Undong: from the beginning to today by the Ministry of Home Affairs, 1974 - 1979?
- 90 -
cements and 1 ton of steel wire while the rest of villages, 18,415 villages of basic stage were 
excluded in the government supports. However, the surprising thing happened in that 6,108 
villages which were not supported by the government continuously participated in Saemaul 
projects even without government supports and became the Self-help villages only with 
villages’ efforts and resources in 197368.  
The share of villages categorized as Self-reliant started to increase rapidly after 1975 
while there were no marked geographic differences in the spatial diffusion of Self-reliant 
villages particularly during the first half of the 1970s (Table 1, Table 6, Figure 1, Figure 2-3, 
and Figure 5). In 1976 - 1977, small regional variation was appeared that counties such as 
Miryang, Haman, and Hadong had less Self-reliant villages than neighbor counties in 
Kyungsangnam-do province while counties such as Jinju, Hamyang, Sanchung, Namhae, 
Sacheon, and Tongyoung had more Self-reliant villages (Figure 5). However, almost every 
region reached the highest levels of equilibrium by 1979 in that 97 percent of total villages 
were classified as Self-reliant villages, compared to only 7 percent in 1972 (Table 1). 84 
percent of total villages in Kyungsangnam-do were classified as Self-reliant villages in 1978 
(Table 5 and Figure 5).  
Basic villages had disappeared by 1976. At the final stage of Saemaul Undong in the 
late 1970s, all the rural villages were promoted to Self-help and Self-reliant levels69 (Table 1, 
Table 6, Figure 1, and Figure 5). Along with the development of villages living environment 
and infrastructure through the implementation of Saemaul projects, rural household income 
had increased and exceeded that of urban wage rate since 1974 (Table 5).
???????????????????????????????????????????
???Saemaul Undong: from the beginning to today by the Ministry of Home Affairs, 1974?
69 By 1980, the government set the different criteria to newly categorize villages as “Self-reliant”,
“Self-employed”, and “Welfare” villages adapting to changing household income and living 
environment in rural villages. According to the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Self-reliant village is 
equipped with improved production infrastructure and living infrastructure while the Self-employed 
village has capacities to manage the business for themselves. In order to become a Welfare village, the 
household income should be more than 4 million KRW (November 11, 1980 from Maeil Business).  
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3.2.3 Random or performance-based: distributive pattern of government grants 
The performance-based support system is one of the most salient features of Saemaul
Undong. It is worthy of compliment considering that political bias and corruption in 
resources allocation have been rather universal in many developing countries. However, there 
are no empirical investigations regarding the mechanism that guided the allocation of 
resources across villages. Therefore, this section attempts to find the linkage between the 
outcomes of Saemaul projects and the allocation of government grants in the 1970s.  
Model 
To identify whether the government distributed grants selectively to high-performing villages 
which showed the remarkable improvement compared to the previous year, or randomly, 
three estimation methods are employed: pooled OLS, random effects and fixed effects. The 
estimation equation is  
??? ? ?? ? ????? ? ???
where ???, dependent variable, denotes the percentage of awarded villages at the county i at 
the year t. The explanatory variable of interest, ???? is the percentage of villages promoted to 
the higher level based on the performance of Saemaul projects at the county i at the year t.  
For example, the number of Basic villages, Self-help villages and Self-reliant villages 
are 65, 109, and 29, respectively at the county i at the year t, and 44, 116, and 43 at the year
t+1. The number of villages promoted from the level of Basic villages to the level of Self-
help villages is 21 (= 65 - 44) and total of Self-help villages become 116 (= 109 + 21 - 14) 
because 14 villages are promoted from the level of Self-help (43 = 29 + 14) to the highest 
level of Self-reliant villages at the year t+1. Therefore, the total number of villages promoted 
to the higher level is 35 (= 21 + 14) at the year t+1.  
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Two assumptions regarding the Saemaul performance indicators are considered; first, 
villages which show outstanding changes are promoted by no more than one level in a year. If 
a village was categorized as a Basic village, the lowest level among three levels, in the year t,
it is not possible to directly become a Self-reliant village, the highest level among three, in 
the year t+1 even though the village shows highly remarkable improvement within one year. 
Second, the development level of villages has never retreated. Once a village becomes a Self-
help village in the year t, for instance, the village never drops to the level of the Basic village 
in the year t+? (? ? ?? again. Villages move only towards upper levels. 
The primary interest lies in testing the null hypothesis  
????????? ? ??????? ? ?.
If the null hypothesis is true, then the government grants were distributed selectively only to 
better-performing villages without considering any political bias, economic condition, public 
finance, geography, year events, etc. In addition, interaction terms are included as following 
??? ? ?? ? ????? ? ????? ? ??? ? ????? ? ??? ? ????? ? ??? ? ???.
Data
Data are constructed at a county level drawn from the Statistics Year book of Kyungsangnam-
do during 1974-78. Performance indicators of villages are only appeared in Kyungsangnam-
do province at a county level. Since data regarding the name of each village categorized as 
Basic, Self-help, and Self-reliant villages, and the name of villages awarded by government 
grants are not available, it is impossible to match the Saemaul outcome and Government 
grants allocation. 
Based on the number of villages in three stages including Basic, Self-help, and Self-
reliant, the number of villages promoted to the next development stage is calculated and 
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matched with the number of villages awarded by the Government grants. According to the 
sample observations from Kyungsangnam-do, only 8 percent of total villages were Self-
reliant villages in 1972 and it increased to 84 percent in 1978 (Table 6 and Figure 5). Basic 
villages had disappeared by 1976 when the amount of government grant reached its peak as 
well (Table 2 and Figure 3). Percentage of awarded villages varies from 10 to 19 percent 
during 1974-78. Table 7 provides descriptive statistics of key variables.  
Results 
The estimation results are in Table 8. The coefficients on the percentage of better-performing 
villages compared to the previous year are almost same and statistically significant for the 
pooled OLS, random effects and fixed effects estimations. The null hypothesis is rejected in 
that the estimated coefficient of percentage of villages promoted is close to 0.25 while the 
estimated coefficient of the constant term is about 7.5. When the independent variable is 
interacted with the year dummies, it measures how the performance-based reward has 
changed over the period. In the system (6), for example, if the promoted village increases by 
10 percentage points, the percentage of grant awarded village increases by 1 in 1975 and 2.3 
percentage points in 1976 respectively. 
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3.3 Conclusion 
In spite of the government documents regarding Saemaul Undong and statements from the
Saemaul practitioners in the 1970s, in which the government selectively supported villages 
based on the performance of Saemaul projects, I could not find empirical evidence on it. 
According to the empirical investigation using the county-level data from Kyungsangnam-do
province, it does not seem that the government provided the supports only to the better-
performing villages compared to the previous year’s performance. However, it does not 
necessarily mean that the government allocated development resources in an egalitarian 
manner or randomly.  
One possible explanation would be that the villages which showed the outstanding 
results in Saemaul projects were supported first and more. The government would provide 
grants with the priority of orders as well as different amounts of rewards. It seems that the 
government did not exclude the villages lagged behind with low performances in the 
community development program. Nonetheless, these ideas are not empirically proven yet 
because data is not available.  
The mechanism of the evaluation and rewards system in Saemaul Undong may not be 
so simple as we have thought to be so far. There might arise occasions when the government 
allocated development resources partially taking into account other information and 
environment such as political situation, financial status of local government, region-specific 
factor or originally disadvantaged villages.  
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Table 1. Village development level, 1972-79 
Year
Basic village Self-help village Self-reliant village Saemaul
VillagesNo. of villages % No. of villages % No. of villages %
1972 18,415 53 13,943 40 2,307 7 34,665
1973 10,656 31 19,763 57 4,246 12 34,665
1974 6,165 18 21,500 62 7,000 20 34,665
1975 4,046 11 20,936 60 10,049 29 35,031
1976 302 1 19,049 54 15,680 45 35,031
1977 0 0 11,709 33 23,322 67 35,031
1978 0 0 6,114 18 28,701 82 34,815
1979 0 0 976 3 3,893 97 34,871
Source: 10 Year History of Saemaul Undong by the Ministry of Home Affairs (1980)
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Table 2. Government grants, 1972-78 
Kyunggi Gangwon Chungbuk Chungnam Geonbuk Geonnam Kyungbuk Kyungnam Jeju Total
1972
Village 8 1 3 1 4 3 20
Grant 53 2 3 1 63 13 135
1973
Village 420 304 273 387 474 621 650 557 22 3,708
Grant 586 459 390 602 571 855 1,092 761 48 5,364
1974
Village 799 460 446 688 751 1,164 1,006 918 64 6,296
Grant 1,063 820 628 1,034 964 1,535 1,581 1,370 103 9,098
1975
Village 652 377 379 662 741 1,280 1,012 947 53 6,103
Grant 703 959 464 815 698 1,223 1,350 1,035 61 7,308
1976
Village 1,013 651 511 929 1,024 1,797 1,263 1,403 71 8,662
Grant 1,335 988 830 1,239 1,355 2,103 1,912 1,788 126 11,676
1977
Village 741 458 712 798 697 1,372 1,140 798 39 6,755
Grant 1,323 1,569 845 1,104 1,092 1,673 1,885 1,378 64 10,933
1978
Village 558 295 240 466 556 614 669 553 37 3,988
Grant 801 443 358 702 792 943 1,012 835 55 5,941
Source: Reconstructed based on Saemaul Undong: from the beginning to today by the Ministry of 
Home Affairs (various volumes) 
Table 3. Criteria for classification of villages 
Project Basic village Self-help village Self-reliant village
Village roads Construction of main village roads
Construction of small 
village roads -
Farm roads Completion of main road to village
Completion of 
small farm roads -
River arrangement Reclamation of streams in villages
Reclamation of
streams bt villages
Reclamation of 
surrounding streams
Irrigation rate 70 percent 70 percent 85 percent
Agricultural machine - Anti-insect(power-driven)
Threshing, Tiller 
(power-driven)
Cooperative farming Cooperative working
Cooperative 
production
Cooperative 
production
Village fund 300,000 Won 500,000 Won 1 million Won
Household income 500,000 Won 800,000 Won 1.4 million Won
Source: Author’s translation based on 10 Year History of Saemaul Undong by the Ministry of Home 
Affairs (1980) 
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Table 4. Types of Government grants, 1974-79 
Year Category Grant(KRW 1000)
Total grant
(KRW 1000)
No. of 
awarded villages
1974
1st Saemaul project 500 - 1,500
9,118,952 6,364
2nd Saemaul project           1,000
Outstanding village
Rivulet arrangement 700 - 2,020
1st Electrification
2nd Electrification
1975
1st Saemaul project (railway)            500
6,961,763 6,266
1st Saemaul project (fishing village)            500
2nd Saemaul project 1,000
Outstanding village
Electrification
1976
1st Saemaul project 1,000
11,697,356 8,672
2nd Saemaul project (railway) 500
2nd Saemaul project (fishing village) 500
2nd Saemaul project (mining village) 500
2nd Saemaul project (northern the river Han)
Rivulet arrangement 1,000 - 2,000
Outstanding village
Electrification 488 - 20,069
1977
Outstanding village 1,500
10,951,500 6,763
Special training village 1,000
Rivulet arrangement 1,000 -3,000
Success case of village
Simultaneous support 3,000
Electrification 125 - 11,310
1978
Outstanding village 1,500
5,952,000 3,994
Special training village 1,000
Success case of village
Simultaneous support 3,000
1979
Outstanding village 1,500
6,153,000 4,044Success case of village
Simultaneous support
Source: Reconstructed based on Saemaul Undong: from the beginning to today by the Ministry of Home 
Affairs (various volumes)
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Table 5. Income between urban and rural area, 1970-78 
Year Urban wage worker (A) Rural household (B) B/A (%)
1970 381,240 255,804 67.1
1971 451,920 356,382 78.9
1972 517,440 429,394 83.0
1973 550,200 480,711 87.4
1974 644,520 674,451 104.6
1975 859,320 872,933 101.6
1976 1,151,760 1,156,300 100.4
1977 1,405,080 1,432,800 102.0
1978 1,916,280 1,884,200 98.3
Source: 10 Year History of Saemaul Undong by the Ministry of Home Affairs (1980) 
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Table 6. Village development level and awarded village, Kyungsangnam-do, 1972, 1973-78 
Year
Basic village Self-help village Self-reliant village Awarded villages
No. of villages % No. of villages % No. of villages % No. of villages %
1972 2,594 55.73 1,701 36.54 360 7.73
1974 1,507 32.21 2,507 53.58 665 14.21 494 10.56
1975 734 15.56 2,749 58.29 1,233 26.15 620 13.15
1976 0 0 2,357 49.98 2,359 50.02 884 18.74
1977 0 0 1301 27.59 3,415 72.41 489 10.37
1978 0 0 755 16.29 3,880 83.71 458 9.88
Source: Author’s calculation based on Statistical Yearbook of Kyungsangnam-do (various volumes) 
Table 7. Sample descriptive statistics, Kyungsangnam-do, 1974-78  
Variables Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
County ID 126 9.50 5.21 1 18
No. of awarded villages 90 32.72 13.46 17 91
Basic villages 108 44.77 57.81 0 230
Self-help villages 108 105.28 54.49 9 246
Self-reliant villages 108 110.30 80.41 11 326
Percentage of awarded villages 90 13.15 7.01 6.72 44.83
Percentage of Basic villages 105 17.69 21.07 0 56.32
Percentage of Self-help villages 108 39.84 17.48 3.50 67.69
Percentage of Self-reliant villages 108 42.97 30.22 5.31 96.50
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Figure 1. Transformation of village development status, total, 1972-79 
Source: 10 Year History of Saemaul Undong by the Ministry of Home Affairs (1980) 
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Figure 2-1. Percentage of Basic villages by county, Kyungsangnam-do, 1972-78 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Statistical Yearbook of Kyungsangnam-do (various volumes) 
Figure 2-2. Percentage of Self-help villages by county, Kyungsangnam-do, 1972-78 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Statistical Yearbook of Kyungsangnam-do (various volumes) 
Figure 2-3. Percentage of Self-reliant villages by county, Kyungsangnam-do, 1972-78
Source: Author’s calculation based on Statistical Yearbook of Kyungsangnam-do (various volumes) 
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Figure 3. Percentage of Grant-awarded villages by county, Kyungsangnam-do, 1974-78
Source: Author’s calculation based on Statistical Yearbook of Kyungsangnam-do (various volumes) 
Figure 4. Number of Grant-awarded villages and total Grant amount, 1972-79 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Saemaul Undong: from the beginning to today by the Ministry 
of Home Affairs (various volumes) 
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Figure 5. Spatial diffusion of Self-reliant villages in Kyungsangnam-do 
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